Agent-zákazník problém v distribuci finančních produktů
[Agent-Principal Problem in Financial Distribution]
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References listed on IDEAS
- William T. Ross, Jr. & Erin Anderson & Barton Weitz, 1997. "Performance in Principal-Agent Dyads: The Causes and Consequences of Perceived Asymmetry of Commitment to the Relationship," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(5), pages 680-704, May.
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
- Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
- Danilov, Anastasia & Biemann, Torsten & Kring, Thorn & Sliwka, Dirk, 2013.
"The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 266-272.
- Anastasia Danilov & Torsten Biemann & Thorn Kring & Dirk Sliwka, 2012. "The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals," Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series 03-13, Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences, revised 18 Dec 2012.
More about this item
Keywordsadverse selection; investment funds; agent-principal problem; financial intermediation and advice; unit-linked life insurance;
- D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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