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Political Regime Change and State Performance

Author

Listed:
  • Debojyoti Mazumder
  • Rajit Biswas

Abstract

The present model analyses how the state would provide services when the change of power depends upon the performance of the state. Agents can evaluate state performance based either only on the receipt of government services, or both on the benefit from government services and taxes imposed. With a credible threat of power change, if the valuation of the government services is low, along with a low fiscal capacity, then it is less probable that this service would be provided. Furthermore, such an allocation is compared with a situation, when there exists a threat of active opposition. Interestingly, that threat does not change the optimum provisioning of government services (as compared to the previous situation) in the equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Debojyoti Mazumder & Rajit Biswas, 2017. "Political Regime Change and State Performance," Review of Economics and Institutions, Universit√† di Perugia, vol. 8(1).
  • Handle: RePEc:pia:review:v:8:y:2017:i:1:n:2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    state capacity; regime change; conflict; taxes; government services;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods

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