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Political Regime Change and State Performance

Listed author(s):
  • Debojyoti Mazumder
  • Rajit Biswas

The present model analyses how the state would provide services when the change of power depends upon the performance of the state. Agents can evaluate state performance based either only on the receipt of government services, or both on the benefit from government services and taxes imposed. With a credible threat of power change, if the valuation of the government services is low, along with a low fiscal capacity, then it is less probable that this service would be provided. Furthermore, such an allocation is compared with a situation, when there exists a threat of active opposition. Interestingly, that threat does not change the optimum provisioning of government services (as compared to the previous situation) in the equilibrium.

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Article provided by Università di Perugia in its journal Review of Economics and Institutions.

Volume (Year): 8 (2017)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:pia:review:v:8:y:2017:i:1:n:2
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  1. Nicola Persico & Alessandro Lizzeri, 2001. "The Provision of Public Goods under Alternative Electoral Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 225-239, March.
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  8. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, 2004. "Greed and grievance in civil war," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(4), pages 563-595, October.
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  12. Christopher Blattman & Edward Miguel, 2009. "Civil War: A Review of Fifty Years of Research," Working Papers id:2231, eSocialSciences.
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