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Norm for redistribution, social capital, and perceived tax burden: comparison between highand low-income households

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  • Eiji Yamamura

Abstract

This paper explores how a perceived tax burden is influenced by the degree that neighbors prefer income redistribution. Further, this paper investigates how the influence of neighbors is affected by the degree of interaction between neighbors. For these purposes, individual-level data and place of residence data were combined. After controlling for individual characteristics, I obtained the following key findings: people are more likely to perceive the amount of tax as low when neighbors are more likely to support redistribution policies. Further, this neighbor effect increases when community participation rates are high. This tendency is clearly observed in high-income groups but not in low-income groups. This implies that the norm for redistribution leads rich people to consider the tax burden as low. Further, the effect of the norm increases when there is a greater accumulation of social capital within a residential area.

Suggested Citation

  • Eiji Yamamura, 2015. "Norm for redistribution, social capital, and perceived tax burden: comparison between highand low-income households," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 6(2).
  • Handle: RePEc:pia:review:v:6:y:2015:i:2:n:3
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    Cited by:

    1. Lorna Zischka, 2014. "Social Capital Stocks, Giving Flows and Welfare Outcomes," Economics & Management Discussion Papers em-dp2014-04, Henley Business School, Reading University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Perceived tax; Norm; Redistribution; Social capital; Externality;

    JEL classification:

    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • H29 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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