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Banki na progu upadłości – refleksje nad postępowaniem

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  • Andrzej R. Stopczyński

    (Uniwersytet Łódzki, Wydział Ekonomiczno-Socjologiczny, Instytut Finansów)

Abstract

Koncepcja resolution banków (postępowania z bankami na progu upadłości), zakładająca rozszerzenie odpowiedzialności za niewypłacalność instytucji finansowej na jej wierzycieli, wydawała się praktycznym rozwiązaniem chroniącym państwa przed koniecznością wykorzystania środków publicznych do utrzymania stabilności prywatnego (w większości) sektora bankowego. Podejście to, wzbudzające jednak wiele kontrowersji, przynosi inne zagrożenia, które mogą istotnie utrudnić rozwiązanie problemu upadającego banku. W artykule autor koncentruje się na ocenie wiarygodności mechanizmów wprowadzonych przez regulacje europejskie. Autor podejmuje próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy regulacje europejskie ograniczają pokusę nadużycia w sektorze bankowym oraz czy mogą być skuteczne w poszczególnych segmentach sektora bankowego. Głównym przedmiotem badań jest znaczenie dyscypliny rynkowej w planowaniu i przeprowadzeniu resolution banku oraz wpływ zakresu umorzeń zobowiązań banku na poziom tej dyscypliny. W oparciu o analizę przypadków resolution w reżimie Dyrektywy BRRD sformułowane zostały wnioski dotyczące możliwości przeprowadzenia potencjalnych procesów resolution w odniesieniu do różnych grup banków w Polsce.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrzej R. Stopczyński, 2020. "Banki na progu upadłości – refleksje nad postępowaniem," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 51(5), pages 517-548.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbp:nbpbik:v:51:y:2020:i:5:p:517-548
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    przymusowa restrukturyzacja i uporządkowana likwidacja (resolution) banków; dyscyplina rynkowa; koszty niewypłacalności; bail-out; bail-in;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management

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