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Financial Crises, Safety Nets and Regulation

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  • Michele Fratianni

Abstract

The historical record shows that financial crises are far from being a rare a phenomenon; they occur often enough to be considered part of the workings of finance capitalism. While there is no single hypothesis that can best explain all crises, the implications of the credit boom-and-bust hypothesis, supplemented with asymmetric information, are consistent with the onset and development of many crises, including the current subprime crisis. Governments have reacted to crises by erecting a vast and growing safety net. In turn, to minimize their risk exposure, they have also put in place expansive systems of regulation and supervision. The unwinding of the current crisis will mark a big enlargement of the safety net and moral hazard, as well as a predictable flurry of policy proposals aimed at closing past regulatory loopholes. The maintained hypothesis is that regulatory and market failures are inexorably intertwined.
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  • Michele Fratianni, 2008. "Financial Crises, Safety Nets and Regulation," Rivista italiana degli economisti, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 169-208.
  • Handle: RePEc:mul:jqat1f:doi:10.1427/29581:y:2008:i:2:p:169-208
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    Cited by:

    1. Michele Fratianni & Francesco Marchionne, 2010. "Banks’ Great Bailout of 2008-2009," Working Papers 2010-03, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    2. Luca Papi & Emma Sarno & Alberto Zazzaro, 2017. "The geographical network of bank organizations: issues and evidence for Italy," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Geographies of Money and Finance, chapter 8, pages 156-196 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Beniamino Moro, 2013. "The Run On Repo and the Liquidity Shortage Problems of the Current Global Financial Crisis: Europe vs. The US," Ekonomi-tek - International Economics Journal, Turkish Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 41-77, January.
    4. Ernesto Screpanti, 2010. "La grande crisi e l’imperialismo globale," Department of Economics University of Siena 590, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
    5. Fratianni, Michele & Giri, Federico, 2017. "The tale of two great crises," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 5-31.
    6. Michele Fratianni & Francesco Marchionne, 2009. "Rescuing Banks from the Effects of the Financial Crisis," Working Papers 2009-04, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy.
    7. Michele Fratianni & Francesco Marchionne, 2009. "The Role of Banks in the Subprime Financial Crisis," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 23, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.
    8. Pietro Alessandrini & Michele Fratianni, 2009. "International Monies, Special Drawing Rights, and Supernational Money," Mo.Fi.R. Working Papers 26, Money and Finance Research group (Mo.Fi.R.) - Univ. Politecnica Marche - Dept. Economic and Social Sciences.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • N20 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - General, International, or Comparative

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