IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mth/ber888/v10y2020i2p46-63.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Deposit Insurance and Bank Risks in Vietnam

Author

Listed:
  • Pham Thi Chi
  • Dao Thanh Binh

Abstract

The relationship between deposit insurance and banking risks has been widely studied, but has been the subject of relatively few empirical studies, especially for Vietnamese banking system. This research aims to explore the effect of deposit insurance on banks' risk taking in Vietnam. The paper employs 7 bank specific variables and 2 macroeconomic variables, as well the premium paid by banks as variables for the regression models used. The results suggest that deposit insurance does impact banks' risk taking incentive but it has different effects on each type of risk. It is concluded that credit, default and leverage risk are found to have a negative relationship with deposit insurance, while leverage and deposit insurance have a positive relationship, which may help banks and supervisors in their decision for the deposit risk premium. This paper contributes to the existing literature by help to understand the impact of deposit insurance on banks risk taking behavior in Vietnamese banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Pham Thi Chi & Dao Thanh Binh, 2020. "Deposit Insurance and Bank Risks in Vietnam," Business and Economic Research, Macrothink Institute, vol. 10(2), pages 46-63, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:mth:ber888:v:10:y:2020:i:2:p:46-63
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ber/article/view/16750/12976
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ber/article/view/16750
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Reint Gropp & Jukka Vesala, 2004. "Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Market Monitoring," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 8(4), pages 571-602.
    2. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt & Ms. Enrica Detragiache, 2000. "Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System Stability?," IMF Working Papers 2000/003, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, 2000. "Bank runs, deposit insurance, and liquidity," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 24(Win), pages 14-23.
    4. Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti & Agnese Leonello, 2011. "Deposit insurance and risk taking," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 27(3), pages 464-478.
    5. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 2002. "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1373-1406, October.
    6. Angkinand, Apanard & Wihlborg, Clas, 2010. "Deposit insurance coverage, ownership, and banks' risk-taking in emerging markets," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 252-274, March.
    7. Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Edward J. Kane, 2002. "Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does It Work?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 175-195, Spring.
    8. Sebastian Schich, 2009. "Financial crisis: Deposit insurance and related financial safety net aspects," OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, OECD Publishing, vol. 2008(2), pages 1-39.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Nafis Alam & Ganesh Sivarajah & Muhammad Ishaq Bhatti, 2021. "Do Deposit Insurance Systems Promote Banking Stability?," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-22, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bernard Bollen & Michael Skully & David Tripe & Xiaoting Wei, 2015. "The Global Financial Crisis and Its Impact on Australian Bank Risk," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 15(1), pages 89-111, March.
    2. Chen, Wang & Zhang, Zhiwen & Hamori, Shigeyuki & Kinkyo, Takuji, 2021. "Not all bank systemic risks are alike: Deposit insurance and bank risk revisited," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    3. Apanard P. Prabha & Clas Wihlborg & Thomas D. Willett, 2012. "Market Discipline for Financial Institutions and Markets for Information," Chapters, in: James R. Barth & Chen Lin & Clas Wihlborg (ed.), Research Handbook on International Banking and Governance, chapter 13, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Beck, Thorsten & Laeven, Luc, 2006. "Resolution of failed banks by deposit insurers : cross-country evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3920, The World Bank.
    5. Essid, Zina & Boujelbene, Younes & Plihon, Dominique, 2014. "Institutional quality and bank instability: cross-countries evidence in emerging countries," MPRA Paper 56251, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. International Association of Deposit Insurers, 2021. "Deposit Insurance Coverage Level and Scope," IADI Research Papers 21-12, International Association of Deposit Insurers.
    7. Alexei Karas & William Pyle & Koen Schoors, 2021. "Deposit Insurance, Moral Hazard and Bank Risk," CESifo Working Paper Series 8867, CESifo.
    8. Li, Gan & Wen-Yao, Wang, 2010. "Partial Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard in Banking," MPRA Paper 25798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Kathryn L. Dewenter & Alan C. Hess & Jonathan Brogaard, 2018. "Institutions and Deposit Insurance: Empirical Evidence," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 54(3), pages 269-292, December.
    10. Klüh, Ulrich, 2005. "Safety Net Design and Systemic Risk: New Empirical Evidence," Discussion Papers in Economics 662, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    11. Günther, Susanne, 2014. "Die Vermeidung von Bank Runs und der Erhalt von Marktdisziplin: Das Dilemma der Bankenregulierung?," Arbeitspapiere 142, University of Münster, Institute for Cooperatives.
    12. Lambert, Claudia & Noth, Felix & Schüwer, Ulrich, 2017. "How do insured deposits affect bank risk? Evidence from the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 81-102.
    13. Delis, Manthos D. & Iosifidi, Maria & Papadopoulos, Panagiotis, 2022. "Blessing or curse? Government funding of deposit insurance and corporate lending," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    14. repec:ces:ifodic:v:17:y:2019:i:1:p:50000000005871 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Kaposty, Florian & Pfingsten, Andreas & Domikowsky, Christian, 2017. "Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Competitive Advantages: Evidence from the Financial Crisis," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168146, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    16. Morrison, Alan D. & White, Lucy, 2011. "Deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 3400-3416.
    17. Nafis Alam & Ganesh Sivarajah & Muhammad Ishaq Bhatti, 2021. "Do Deposit Insurance Systems Promote Banking Stability?," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-22, September.
    18. Noman, Abu Hanifa Md. & Hassan, M. Kabir & Pervin, Sajeda & Isa, Che Ruhana & Sok-gee, Chan, 2022. "The mediating role of competition on deposit insurance and the risk-taking of banks in ASEAN countries," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    19. Delis, Manthos & Iosifidi, Maria & Papadopoulos, Panagiotis, 2020. "Blessing or curse? Government funding of deposit insurance and corporate lending," MPRA Paper 99153, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Bressan, Valéria Gama Fully & Braga, Marcelo José & Bressan, Aureliano Angel & Resende Filho, Moisés de Andrade, 2012. "O seguro depósito induz ao risco moral nas cooperativas de crédito brasileiras? Um estudo com dados em painel," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 66(2), June.
    21. Deniz Anginer & Ata Can Bertay, 2019. "Deposit Insurance," ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 17(01), pages 03-08, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit risk; Default risk; Deposit insurance; Leverage risk; Liquidity risk;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mth:ber888:v:10:y:2020:i:2:p:46-63. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Technical Support Office (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ber .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.