Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability: A Rationale for Consistency
Adopting an evolutionary approach, we explain the conjectural variations firms may hold in duopoly. Given conjectures, firms play the market game rationally. Success in the market game determines fitness in the evolutionary game. Based on linear heterogeneous Cournot and Bertrand competition models, we show that the unique conjectures that are evolutionarily stable are consistent in that they anticipate the rival's behavior correctly.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 161 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite|
|Order Information:|| Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200509)161:3_491:cvaesa_2.0.tx_2-g. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.