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Fighting Greed with Money: How Wage Levels Impact Corruption in the Private Purchasing Sector

Author

Listed:
  • Gabriela de la Torre Campos

    (FH Joanneum, Austria)

  • Katharina Radler

    (FH Joanneum, Austria)

  • Bramantio Utomo Saptoadi

    (FH Joanneum, Austria)

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to see whether different wage levels in the private purchasing sector relate to the level of corruptibility. An experiment was conducted that put participants in the role of employees of a purchasing department of a multinational enterprise. The employees were allotted to different wage levels and had to choose between options with different levels of corruption. The research is of a deductive nature and complemented by a descriptive quantitative approach containing the Chi-Square analysis. The results show that there is no association between the wage level and the level of corruptibility of employees in the private purchasing sector. This outcome contributes to the underresearched field of corruption in the private sector and gives further insight into the influence of wages on corruptibility, as well as the usability of the principal-agent theory in the field of corruption.

Suggested Citation

  • Gabriela de la Torre Campos & Katharina Radler & Bramantio Utomo Saptoadi, 2017. "Fighting Greed with Money: How Wage Levels Impact Corruption in the Private Purchasing Sector," Management, University of Primorska, Faculty of Management Koper, vol. 12(4), pages 355-374.
    • Handle: RePEc:mgt:youmng:v:12:y:2017:i:4:p:355-374
    DOI: 10.26493/1854-4231.12.355-374
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    References listed on IDEAS

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