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Sequential asymmetric auctions with endogenous participation

Author

Listed:
  • Flavio Menezes
  • Paulo Monteiro

Abstract

We study sequential auctions of stochastically identical objects and endogenous participation.
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Suggested Citation

  • Flavio Menezes & Paulo Monteiro, 1997. "Sequential asymmetric auctions with endogenous participation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 187-202, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:43:y:1997:i:2:p:187-202
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1004970725802
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. & Menezes, F., 1993. "Sequential Auction with Continuation Costs," Papers 255, Australian National University - Department of Economics.
    2. Ashenfelter, Orley & Genesove, David, 1992. "Testing for Price Anomalies in Real-Estate Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 501-505, May.
    3. Menezes, Flavio M., 1993. "Sequential auctions with delay costs : A two-period model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(2-3), pages 173-178.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Flavio Menezes & Paulo Monteiro, 2003. "Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 8(1), pages 85-98, August.
    2. Olivier Chanel & Stéphanie Vincent, 1998. "La décroissance des prix au cours d'enchères séquentielles : sources et mesures," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 139-157.
    3. Menezes, Flavio M & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 1998. "Simultaneous Pooled Auctions," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 219-232, November.
    4. Jeongwoo Lee & Jaeok Park, 2019. "Preemptive Entry in Sequential Auctions with Participation Cost," Working papers 2019rwp-141, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute.
    5. Ginsburgh, V. & van Ours, J.C., 2003. "How to Organize Sequential Auctions : Results of a Natural Experiment by Christie's," Other publications TiSEM 01ec6d80-7501-441c-a60b-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Chris Jones & Flavio Menezes & Francis Vella, 2004. "Auction Price Anomalies: Evidence from Wool Auctions in Australia," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 80(250), pages 271-288, September.
    7. Tu, Zhiyong, 2010. "A Resale Explanation for the Declining Price Anomaly in Sequential Auctions," Review of Applied Economics, Lincoln University, Department of Financial and Business Systems, vol. 6(1-2), pages 1-15, April.
    8. Zulehner, Christine, 2009. "Bidding behavior in sequential cattle auctions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 33-42, January.
    9. Ghosh, Gagan & Liu, Heng, 2021. "Sequential auctions with ambiguity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    10. Yunhan Li & J. Scott Shonkwiler, 2021. "Assessing the Role of Ordering in Sequential English Auctions – Evidence from the Online Western Video Market Auction," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 103(1), pages 90-105, January.
    11. Gerard J. van den Berg & Jan C. van Ours & Menno P. Pradhan, 2001. "The Declining Price Anomaly in Dutch Dutch Rose Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 1055-1062, September.
    12. Christine Zulehner, 2007. "Bidding behavior in sequential cattle auctions," Vienna Economics Papers vie0705, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sequential auctions; participation costs; endogeneous participation; price decline anomaly;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
    • D3 - Microeconomics - - Distribution
    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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