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Stronger women, better men? Family bargaining and public policy in contemporary Russia

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  • Natalya Y. Shelkova

    (Guilford College)

Abstract

The paper investigates the effects of Russia’s 2007 ‘Maternal Capital Law’, a non-cash subsidy awarded to mothers with the birth of their second or higher order child, on men’s consumption of alcohol. It uses introduction of the Law as a natural experiment to track the effects of increased women’s power due to their greater contribution to familial resources on male private consumption. The fixed effects difference-in-difference model, which groups families by their likelihood of having an eligible child, uses 2003–2012 data from Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS-HSE). Consistent with the family bargaining theories, the findings indicate that introduction of the Law contributed to the decline in male alcohol consumption.

Suggested Citation

  • Natalya Y. Shelkova, 2020. "Stronger women, better men? Family bargaining and public policy in contemporary Russia," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 335-355, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:reveho:v:18:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s11150-019-09441-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11150-019-09441-6
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