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Product Market Cooperation, Profits and Welfare in the Presence of Labor Union

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  • Arijit Mukherjee

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Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Arijit Mukherjee, 2010. "Product Market Cooperation, Profits and Welfare in the Presence of Labor Union," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 151-160, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:10:y:2010:i:2:p:151-160
    DOI: 10.1007/s10842-009-0063-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
    2. Calabuig, Vicente & Gonzalez-Maestre, Miguel, 2002. "Union structure and incentives for innovation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 177-192, March.
    3. Layard, Richard & Nickell, Stephen & Jackman, Richard, 2005. "Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the Labour Market," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199279173.
    4. Davidson, Carl, 1988. "Multiunit Bargaining in Oligopolistic Industries," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(3), pages 397-422, July.
    5. Dhillon, Amrita & Petrakis, Emmanuel, 2002. "A generalised wage rigidity result," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 285-311, March.
    6. Henrick Horn & Asher Wolinsky, 1988. "Bilateral Monopolies and Incentives for Merger," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 408-419, Autumn.
    7. Fershtman, Chaim & Gandal, Neil, 1994. "Disadvantageous semicollusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 141-154, June.
    8. George Symeonidis, 2008. "Downstream Competition, Bargaining, and Welfare," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(1), pages 247-270, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Domenico Buccella, 2014. "Bargaining Structures and Agendas in an Unconstrained Hotelling Model," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 8(3), pages 149-167, December.
    2. Domenico Buccella, 2013. "Unions' bargaining coordination in multi-unit firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(1), pages 217-225.
    3. Domenico Buccella, 2014. "Product market competition with differentiated goods and social welfare in the presence of an industry-wide union," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 13(2), pages 131-140, August.
    4. Liu, Chih-Chen & Mukherjee, Arijit & Wang, Leonard F.S., 2016. "Product market cooperation, entry and consumer welfare," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 277-280.
    5. Domenico Buccella, 2013. "Unions’ bargaining coordination in multinational enterprises," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 373-392, November.
    6. Domenico Buccella, 2015. "Unionized duopoly, market competition with differentiated products, and welfare," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, vol. 42(4), pages 455-473, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    consumer surplus; cooperation; labor union; profit; welfare; L13; L13; L41; D43; J51;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects

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