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Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications

Author

Listed:
  • Sumi Cho
  • Sang‐Ho Lee
  • Xoan T. Hoang

Abstract

This study incorporates the corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives of a domestic firm and analyses strategic trade policy towards a foreign firm in a different market structure. We show that the tariff rate under a foreign (domestic) firm's leadership is lowest when the degree of CSR is large (small). We also show that the foreign firm's leadership yields the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is intermediate, while the domestic firm's leadership yields the highest welfare otherwise. In an endogenous‐timing game, we show that a simultaneous‐move outcome is the unique equilibrium when the degree of CSR is small; thus, it is never socially desirable. We also show that the domestic firm's leadership can be an equilibrium, which results in the highest welfare when the degree of CSR is large. Finally, when the degree of CSR is large, collusive behaviours between the domestic and foreign firms can increase welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Sumi Cho & Sang‐Ho Lee & Xoan T. Hoang, 2019. "Corporate social responsibility and strategic trade policy: An endogenous timing game and its policy implications," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 480-497, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ausecp:v:58:y:2019:i:4:p:480-497
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-8454.12164
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    Cited by:

    1. Xu, Lili & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2021. "Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility by a Multinational Firm and International Privatization Policies," MPRA Paper 105651, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Xingtang Wang & Leonard F. S. Wang, 2024. "Corporate social responsibility and tariff policy in a differentiated mixed duopoly," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(2), pages 470-487, April.
    3. Lili Xu & Fanrui Su & Sang-Ho Lee, 2023. "Strategic corporate social responsibility and partial privatization policy with foreign penetration," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 74(2), pages 251-278, April.
    4. Sang-Ho Lee & Timur K. Muminov, 2021. "Endogenous Timing of R&D Decisions and Privatization Policy with Research Spillovers," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 505-525, December.
    5. Xu, Lili & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2020. "Strategic Relations between Corporate Social Responsibility and Partial Privatization Policy with Foreign Penetration," MPRA Paper 100770, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Xu, Lili & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2021. "Strategic corporate social responsibility and tariff policies: The timing of commitments and policy implications," MPRA Paper 108499, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Jumpei Hamamura & Vinay Ramani, 2024. "The welfare effect of release timing of relative performance evaluation under quantity competition and asymmetric costs," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 71(3), pages 416-438, July.
    8. Junichi Haraguchi & Toshihiro Matsumura, 2021. "Profit‐enhancing entries in mixed oligopolies," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 88(1), pages 33-55, July.
    9. Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella, 2023. "Vertical industry and strategic trade policy," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 1-16, February.
    10. Lili Xu & Yidan Zhang & Sang‐Ho Lee, 2024. "Effects of partial passive ownership in a successive endogenous timing game with R&D spillovers," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(1), pages 283-297, January.
    11. Jiaqi Chen & Doori Kim & Sang‐Ho Lee, 2024. "Endogenous timing of R&D decisions with spillovers: Output versus research subsidies," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 76(3), pages 631-649, July.
    12. Arturo García & Mariel Leal & Sang‐Ho Lee, 2020. "Welfare‐improving cooperation with a consumer‐friendly multiproduct corporation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(7), pages 1144-1155, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship

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