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Product market cooperation, entry and consumer welfare

Author

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  • Liu, Chih-Chen
  • Mukherjee, Arijit
  • Wang, Leonard F.S.

Abstract

It is usually believed that product-market cooperation among the competing firms is detrimental for the consumers. We show that this view may not be true in an endogenously determined market structure. Product-market cooperation may benefit the consumers by inducing entry of new firms. Our result is important for competition policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Chih-Chen & Mukherjee, Arijit & Wang, Leonard F.S., 2016. "Product market cooperation, entry and consumer welfare," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 277-280.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:44:y:2016:i:c:p:277-280
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2016.02.017
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Domenico Buccella & Leonard F. S. Wang, 2021. "Union negotiations, product market cooperation, and profits," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(1), pages 82-100, February.
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    5. Lizana, Jesús & Chacartegui, Ricardo & Barrios-Padura, Angela & Ortiz, Carlos, 2018. "Advanced low-carbon energy measures based on thermal energy storage in buildings: A review," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 82(P3), pages 3705-3749.
    6. Lopez, Rigoberto A. & He, Xi & De Falcis, Eleonora, 2017. "What Drives China’s New Agricultural Subsidies?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 279-292.

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    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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