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Tacit Collusion, Free Entry, and Welfare

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  • Brander, James A
  • Spencer, Barbara J

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  • Brander, James A & Spencer, Barbara J, 1985. "Tacit Collusion, Free Entry, and Welfare," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(3), pages 277-294, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:33:y:1985:i:3:p:277-94
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mercenier, Jean & Schmitt, Nicolas, 1996. "On Sunk Costs and Trade Liberalization in Applied General Equilibrium," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 37(3), pages 553-571, August.
    2. Shih-shen Chen & Chu-Chuan Hsu & Chin-shu Huang, 2013. "Lobbying, corruption and “optimal” tariff," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 60(4), pages 375-386, December.
    3. Andrea Pawliczek & A. Nicole Skinner & Sarah L. C. Zechman, 2022. "Facilitating Tacit Collusion Through Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Common Ownership," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(5), pages 1651-1693, December.
    4. Mercenier, J. & Schmitt, N., 1992. "Sunk Costs, Free-Entry Equilibrium and Trade Liberalization in Applied General Equilibrium : Implication for "Europe 1992"," Cahiers de recherche 9235, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    5. Aldo Montesano, 2012. "Price collusion with free entry: the parasitic competition," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 59(1), pages 41-65, March.
    6. Symeonidis, George, 2018. "Collusion, profitability and welfare: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 530-545.
    7. Germán Coloma, 2010. "El número óptimo de empresas bajo competencia de Bertrand," Estudios de Economia, University of Chile, Department of Economics, vol. 37(2 Year 20), pages 189-205, December.
    8. Goerke, Laszlo, 2020. "A political economy perspective on horizontal FDI in a dynamic Cournot-oligopoly with endogenous entry," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    9. Cacciatore, Matteo & Fiori, Giuseppe & Ghironi, Fabio, 2015. "The domestic and international effects of euro area market reforms," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(4), pages 555-581.
    10. Marc Escrihuela-Villar, 2016. "On the price effects of collusion and the number of firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 36(3), pages 1694-1704.
    11. Liu, Chih-Chen & Mukherjee, Arijit & Wang, Leonard F.S., 2016. "Product market cooperation, entry and consumer welfare," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 277-280.
    12. Michael Higl, 2003. "Vertikale Kooperation im OligopolDie Gestaltung der Genossenschaftsorganisation als strategischer Zug," Discussion Paper Series 243, Universitaet Augsburg, Institute for Economics.
    13. Kurata, Hiroshi & Ohkawa, Takao & Okamura, Makoto, 2009. "Location choice, competition, and welfare in non-tradable service FDI," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 20-25, January.
    14. George Symeonidis, 2000. "Price and Nonprice Competition with Endogenous Market Structure," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(1), pages 53-83, March.
    15. Christian Johansson & Anders Kärnä & Jaakko Meriläinen, 2023. "Vox Populi, Vox Dei? Tacit collusion in politics," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(3), pages 752-772, November.
    16. Marco de Pinto & Laszlo Goerke & Alberto Palermo, 2024. "Business Stealing + Economic Rent = Insufficient Entry? An Integrative Framework," IAAEU Discussion Papers 202402, Institute of Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU).
    17. Schmitt, Nicolas & Weder, Rolf, 1998. "Sunk costs and cartel formation: Theory and application to the dyestuff industry," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 197-220, August.

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