Costs and prices for inpatient care in England: Mirror twins or distant cousins?
The National Health Service (NHS) in England is introducing a national cost-per-case tariff system for the reimbursement of hospital services. Unlike most other countries with similar payment mechanisms, hospitals in England will have few alternative sources of income once the tariff system is fully implemented. This new financial regime generates powerful incentives for change, but exposes purchasers and providers to considerable financial risks. This paper examines the structure of the tariff. We describe how costs are determined, analyse the extent to which prices reflect costs, and review the results of an early evaluation of the system. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2006
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Volume (Year): 9 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
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- John Appleby & Renu Jobanputra, 2004. "Payment by Results," New Economy, Institute for Public Policy Research, vol. 11(4), pages 195-200, December.
- Dusheiko, Mark & Gravelle, Hugh & Jacobs, Rowena & Smith, Peter, 2006. "The effect of financial incentives on gatekeeping doctors: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 449-478, May.
- Marisa Miraldo & Maria Goddard & Peter C Smith, 2006. "The incentive effects of payment by results," Working Papers 019cherp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York.
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