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Did 'Targets and Terror' Reduce Waiting Times in England for Hospital Care?

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Listed:
  • Propper Carol

    (University of Bristol and Imperial College)

  • Sutton Matt

    (University of Aberdeen)

  • Whitnall Carolyn

    (University of Bristol)

  • Windmeijer Frank

    (University of Bristol)

Abstract

Waiting times have been a central concern in the English NHS, where care is provided free at the point of delivery and is rationed by waiting time. Pro-market reforms introduced in the NHS in the 1990s were not accompanied by large drops in waiting times. As a result, the English government in 2000 adopted the use of an aggressive policy of targets coupled with the publication of waiting times data at the hospital level and strong sanctions for poor performing hospital managers. This regime has been dubbed targets and terror'. We estimate the effect of the English target regime for waiting times for hospital care after 2001 by a comparative analysis with Scotland, a neighbouring country with the same healthcare system that did not adopt the target regime. We estimate difference-in-differences models of the proportion of people on the waiting list who waited over 6, 9 and 12 months. Comparisons between England and Scotland are sensitive to whether published or unpublished data are used but, regardless of the data source, the targets and terror' regime in England lowered the proportion of people waiting for elective treatment relative to Scotland.

Suggested Citation

  • Propper Carol & Sutton Matt & Whitnall Carolyn & Windmeijer Frank, 2008. "Did 'Targets and Terror' Reduce Waiting Times in England for Hospital Care?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(2), pages 1-27, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:8:y:2008:i:2:n:5
    DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.1863
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    JEL classification:

    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises

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