A note on peer effects between teams
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More about this item
KeywordsPeer effects; Organization of work; Public good experiments; C92; H41; J2;
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
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