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Which Corporate Real Estate Management Functions Should be Outsourced?

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Abstract

Recently, there has been much interest in outsourcing corporate real estate management functions. We explain why firms should consider outsourcing and identify both positive benefits and possible negative consequences of outsourcing. Further, we utilize concepts from the neoclassical theory of the firm, supported by the literature on corporate real estate outsourcing, to shed some light on how much and which corporate real estate management functions should be outsourced. Functions associated with "taskmasters", "controllers", and "dealmakers" are more likely to be outsourced successfully. "Entrepreneur" and "business strategist" management functions are more likely to be carried out more effectively by internal managers. Outsourcing the appropriate real estate management functions, consistent with each company's individual needs, should enhance shareholder wealth.

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  • Christopher A. Manning & Mauricio Rodriguez & Stephen E. Roulac, 1997. "Which Corporate Real Estate Management Functions Should be Outsourced?," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 14(3), pages 259-274.
  • Handle: RePEc:jre:issued:v:14:n:3:1997:p:259-274
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    Cited by:

    1. Chris Manning & Stephen E. Roulac, 2001. "Lessons from the Past and Future Directions for Corporate Real Estate Research," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 22(1/2), pages 7-58.
    2. Muczyński, Andrzej, 2022. "Organizational model of municipal housing stock management in the contracting system–A case study of Poland," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    3. Paula Pietilä & Anna-Kaisa Kauppinen, 2001. "Modelling of outsourcing decision-making process in the Finnish market," ERES eres2001_256, European Real Estate Society (ERES).
    4. Stephen E. Roulac, 2001. "Corporate Property Strategy is Integral to Corporate Business Strategy," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 22(1/2), pages 129-152.

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    JEL classification:

    • L85 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Real Estate Services

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