Performance Measurement Technologies and the Trade-off of Risk and Incentives
This paper analyzes a principal's decision of when to invest in a performance measurement technology. Interestingly, higher risk may make such an investment less likely. In this case, the strength of incentives certainly decreases. If, however, an increase in risk induces an initially non-investing principal to invest, incentive strength may increase.
Volume (Year): 6 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
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Hitotsubashi University, vol. 36(1), pages 1-17, January.
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- Canice Prendergast, 2002. "The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1071-1102, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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