The U-Shaped Effect of Non-CEO Executives’ Internal Governance on Corporate Innovation Investment: Evidence from China

Against the backdrop of the increasingly salient constraints of resource scarcity and environmental pressures on global economic development, sustainable innovation emerges as an imperative strategic pathway for corporations to secure a competitive edge in the international marketplace. Corporate innovation capability serves as the critical factor for both the advancement of sustainable innovation and the maintenance of the corporate competitive edge. While the extant literature has extensively explored how internal and external governance mechanism forces shape corporate investment decision-making, the critical role of non-CEO executives in the process of corporate innovation investment decision-making remains conspicuously underexplored. This study examines the effect of bottom–up governance mechanisms within executive teams on corporate innovation investment from the perspective of non-CEO executive independence. We used a sample of A-listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2007 to 2021 for empirical tests. We found a U-shaped relation between non-CEO executive independence and corporate innovation investment, and this finding still held after addressing endogeneity issues and conducting a series of robustness tests. Mechanism analysis revealed that both non-CEO executives’ decision horizon and firm agency costs positively moderate this U-shaped relationship. This U-shaped effect is pronounced in firms with lower CEO power, lower levels of corporate governance, and non-state-owned firms. Our findings provide an important basis for clarifying the internal governance mechanism of the executive teams while offering new insights for optimizing the allocation of corporate resources and promoting corporate innovation from the perspective of improving corporate governance.