IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/fip/fedker/00051.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How Do FOMC Projections Affect Policy Uncertainty?

Author

Listed:
  • Brent Bundick
  • Trenton Herriford

Abstract

In January 2012, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) began publicly releasing its participants? projections for the future value of the federal funds rate. The former FOMC Chair Ben Bernanke stated that these releases help the public form policy expectations. However, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco President John C. Williams noted that the range of the funds rate forecast conveyed disagreement and uncertainty. These projections may be conflicting in nature, and thus may not lower public uncertainty. Bundick and Herriford seek to answer the question: do these projections decrease or increase uncertainty about future policy? To answer this question, the authors measure how uncertainty about future interest rates changed after the FOMC began releasing its participants? projections for the appropriate federal funds rate. The authors found that the overall uncertainty about future interest rates decreased after FOMC began releasing its participants? interest rate projections. However, the authors found that public uncertainty is correlated with disagreement across participants? projections. In sum, the findings provide empirical support for the claims of Bernanke and Williams.

Suggested Citation

  • Brent Bundick & Trenton Herriford, 2017. "How Do FOMC Projections Affect Policy Uncertainty?," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q II, pages 5-22.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedker:00051
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.kansascityfed.org/documents/462/2017-How%20Do%20FOMC%20Projections%20Affect%20Policy%20Uncertainty%3F.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Glenn D. Rudebusch & John C. Williams, 2008. "Revealing the Secrets of the Temple: The Value of Publishing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections," NBER Chapters, in: Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, pages 247-289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. George A. Kahn & Andrew Palmer, 2016. "Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: Revelations from the FOMC's Summary of Economic Projections," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q I, pages 5-37.
    3. Swanson, Eric T., 2006. "Have Increases in Federal Reserve Transparency Improved Private Sector Interest Rate Forecasts?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(3), pages 791-819, April.
    4. George A. Kahn & Andrew Palmer, 2016. "Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: Revelations from the Summary of Economic Projections," Macro Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 1-4, April.
    5. Campbell, John Y. (ed.), 2008. "Asset Prices and Monetary Policy," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226092119, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Michael D Bauer & Aeimit Lakdawala & Philippe Mueller, 2022. "Market-Based Monetary Policy Uncertainty," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 132(644), pages 1290-1308.
    2. Brent Bundick & Andrew Lee Smith, 2022. "Evaluating Quantitative Easing: The Importance of Accounting for Forward Guidance," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, vol. 107(no.3), pages 1-16, June.
    3. Carola Conces Binder & Rodrigo Sekkel, 2023. "Central Bank Forecasting: A Survey," Staff Working Papers 23-18, Bank of Canada.
    4. Bundick, Brent & Herriford, Trenton & Smith, A. Lee, 2024. "The Term Structure of Monetary Policy Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).
    5. Binder, Carola Conces, 2019. "Comment on “Central Bank announcements: Big news for little people?” by Michael Lamla and Dmitri Vinogradov," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 39-44.
    6. Brent Bundick & Andrew Lee Smith, 2020. "Policymakers Have Options for Additional Accommodation: Forward Guidance and Yield Curve Control," Economic Bulletin, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 1-5, July.
    7. Carola Conces Binder, 2021. "Central Bank Communication and Disagreement about the Natural Rate Hypothesis," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 17(2), pages 81-123, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    2. Jung, Alexander & El-Shagi, Makram & Giesen, Sebastian, 2014. "Does the federal reserve staff still beat private forecasters?," Working Paper Series 1635, European Central Bank.
    3. Bofinger, Peter & Schnabel, Isabel & Feld, Lars P. & Schmidt, Christoph M. & Wieland, Volker, 2017. "Für eine zukunftsorientierte Wirtschaftspolitik. Jahresgutachten 2017/18 [Towards a Forward-Looking Economic Policy. Annual Report 2017/18]," Annual Economic Reports / Jahresgutachten, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, volume 127, number 201718.
    4. Kurt G. Lunsford, 2020. "Policy Language and Information Effects in the Early Days of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(9), pages 2899-2934, September.
    5. Kurt Graden Lunsford, 2018. "Understanding the Aspects of Federal Reserve Forward Guidance," Working Papers (Old Series) 1815, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    6. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B., 2008. "The economic impact of central bank transparency," Other publications TiSEM 86c1ba91-1952-45b4-adac-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Feroli, Michael & Greenlaw, David & Hooper, Peter & Mishkin, Frederic S. & Sufi, Amir, 2017. "Language after liftoff: Fed communication away from the zero lower bound," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 452-490.
    8. Gu, Chen & Kurov, Alexander & Wolfe, Marketa Halova, 2018. "Relief Rallies after FOMC Announcements as a Resolution of Uncertainty," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 1-18.
    9. Jeffrey R. Campbell & Thomas B. King & Anna Orlik & Rebecca Zarutskie, 2020. "Issues Regarding the Use of the Policy Rate Tool," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-070, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    10. Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Hughes Hallett Andrew & Acocella Nicola, 2013. "When Can Policy Makers Anchor Expectations? Dynamic controllability and the limits to time inconsistency," wp.comunite 0104, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    11. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5221 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Rholes, Ryan & Petersen, Luba, 2021. "Should central banks communicate uncertainty in their projections?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 320-341.
    13. Meredith Beechey & Pär Österholm, 2014. "Central Bank Forecasts of Policy Interest Rates: An Evaluation of the First Years," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 43(1), pages 63-78, February.
    14. Martin Melecký & Diego Rodríguez Palenzuela & Ulf Söderström, 2009. "Inflation Target Transparency and the Macroeconomy," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Carl E. Walsh & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.),Monetary Policy under Uncertainty and Learning, edition 1, volume 13, chapter 10, pages 371-411, Central Bank of Chile.
    15. Nadav Ben Zeev & Christopher Gunn & Hashmat Khan, 2020. "Monetary News Shocks," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(7), pages 1793-1820, October.
    16. Monica Jain & Christopher S. Sutherland, 2020. "How Do Central Bank Projections and Forward Guidance Influence Private-Sector Forecasts?," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(5), pages 179-218, October.
    17. Nikolay Gospodinov & Ibrahim Jamali, 2018. "Monetary policy uncertainty, positions of traders and changes in commodity futures prices," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 24(2), pages 239-260, March.
    18. Gersbach, Hans & Liu, Yulin & Tischhauser, Martin, 2021. "Versatile forward guidance: escaping or switching?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    19. Hallett, Andrew Hughes & Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2010. "Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 55-67, March.
    20. Gai, Prasanna & Lou, Edmund & Wu, Sherry X., 2020. "Targeted disclosure and monetary policy flexibility: A simple model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
    21. Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Carl E. Walsh, 2009. "Monetary Policy under Uncertainty and Learning: An Overview," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Carl E. Walsh & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.),Monetary Policy under Uncertainty and Learning, edition 1, volume 13, chapter 1, pages 001-025, Central Bank of Chile.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedker:00051. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Zach Kastens (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/frbkcus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.