Argentina, Mexico, and currency boards: another case of rules versus discretion
This article discusses currency boards in light of the recent economic experiences of Mexico and Argentina. Carlos Zarazaga argues that currency boards do not solve the important time inconsistency problem pointed out in the rules-versus-discretion literature. Because of this failure, even the quasi-currency board established by law (the so-called convertibility law) did not protect Argentina from one of its most severe financial crises in modern times. ; In addition, there is the normative issue of whether an ironclad rule such as a currency board rule is superior to a noncontingent one. Zarazaga argues that is not the case, except perhaps when the distinction between these two kinds of rules has become blurred in countries with poor reputations for following policy commitments. In such circumstances, ironclad rules theoretically might be desirable, although this conjecture has yet to be proved formally and verified empirically. Zarazaga argues that the study of the recent economic experiences of Mexico and Argentina could be useful for addressing both issues.
Volume (Year): (1995)
Issue (Month): Q IV ()
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