Currency Board: From Stabilization to Full Dollarization? The Argentine Experience
The aim of this work is to present in a systematic way elements around the debate on the persistence of a central bank arrangement, currency boards or the Dollarization option. In some special circumstances, both later arrangements could be desirable. They are not a universal panacea in the way to stabilization and sound growth. The case of Argentina in recent decades is analyzed. There, the currency board could be an intermediate step to full Dollarization.
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