De bancos centrales, juntas monetarias y dolarización
[On central banks, currency boards and dollarization]
The objective of this article is to present in a systematic war elements to debate the persistence of the option for central banks, against its replacement by currency boards or by a foreign currency in unstable environments. Both, currency boards or "dollarization" could be desirable since the point of view of stability and growth with respect to a traditional central bank agreement. But they entail a loss of degrees of freedom before crisis and they are not time consistent.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2001|
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