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Conflicting Financial Incentives in the Irish Health-Care System


    (Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin Trinity College Dublin)


    (Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin Trinity College Dublin)


    (Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin Trinity College Dublin)


    (Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin Trinity College Dublin)

In health care, there is extensive empirical evidence that the behaviour of both providers and users is affected by the financial incentives that they face. In this paper, we adopt a systemwide perspective and develop a conceptual framework to examine how current financial incentives in Irish health care conflict along four dimensions: provider versus user, user across type of provider, provider versus provider, and provider across type of user. We highlight areas within each of these four dimensions where current financial incentive structures are incompatible with existing policy priorities. The analysis in the paper also provides a framework to assess the effects of proposed policy changes on financial incentives within the health-care system using a joint analytic approach.

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Article provided by Economic and Social Studies in its journal Economic and Social Review.

Volume (Year): 43 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 273–301

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Handle: RePEc:eso:journl:v:43:y:2012:i:2:p:273-301
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  15. Brick, Aoife & Nolan, Anne & O'Reilly, Jacqueline & Smith, Samantha, 2010. "Resource Allocation, Financing and Sustainability in the Health Sector," Papers RB2010/3/1, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI).
  16. Tussing, A. Dale, 1985. "Irish Medical Care Resources: An Economic Analysis," Research Series, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), number GRS126.
  17. Michel Grignon & Marc Perronnin & John N. Lavis, 2008. "Does free complementary health insurance help the poor to access health care? Evidence from France," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(2), pages 203-219.
  18. Joseph P. Newhouse, 1996. "Reimbursing Health Plans and Health Providers: Efficiency in Production versus Selection," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(3), pages 1236-1263, September.
  19. Gannon, Brenda & Layte, Richard & McGregor, Pat & Madden, David & Nolan, Anne & O'Neill, Ciaran & Smith, Samantha, 2007. "The Provision and Use of Health Services, Health Inequalities and Health and Social Gain," Research Series, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), number BMI196 edited by Nolan, Brian.
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