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Introducing Activity-Based Payment in the Hospital Industry: Evidence from French Data

Author

Listed:
  • Philippe Choné
  • Franck Evain
  • Lionel Wilner
  • Engin Yilmaz

Abstract

Many countries have reformed hospital reimbursement policies to provide stronger incentives for quality and cost reduction. The purpose of this work is to understand how the effect of such reforms depends on the intensity of local competition. We build a nonprice competition model to examine the effect of a shift from global budget to patient-based payment for public hospitals in France. We predict that the number of patient admissions should increase in public hospitals by more than in private clinics and that the increase in admissions is stronger in public hospitals more exposed to competitive pressure from private clinics. Considering the reform implemented in France between 2005 and 2008, we find empirical evidence supporting these predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe Choné & Franck Evain & Lionel Wilner & Engin Yilmaz, 2013. "Introducing Activity-Based Payment in the Hospital Industry: Evidence from French Data," CESifo Working Paper Series 4304, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4304
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. #HEJC papers for August 2013
      by academichealtheconomists in The Academic Health Economists' Blog on 2013-08-01 04:00:48

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Siciliani, Luigi & Chalkley, Martin & Gravelle, Hugh, 2017. "Policies towards hospital and GP competition in five European countries," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 103-110.
    2. Engin Yilmaz & Albert Vuagnat, 2015. "Tarification à l'activité et réadmission," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 475(1), pages 71-87.
    3. Choné, Philippe, 2017. "Competition policy for health care provision in France," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 111-118.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    health care markets; prospective payment system; local competition; not-for-profit hospitals;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out

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