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Pro-market reforms and allocation of capital in India

  • Sameeksha Desai
  • Johan Eklund
  • Andreas Högberg

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to study the efficiency of capital allocation, across levels of ownership, in the aftermath of pro-market reforms in India. Design/methodology/approach – The paper measures investment efficiency using the accelerator principle and examines the effect of ownership type on capital allocation. Findings – No significant improvement in capital allocation during the period studied is found. The findings suggest firms face significant costs in adjusting their capital stock. Originality/value – The paper uses unique data to estimate the elasticity of capital with respect to output. JEL classification: E22, E23, G18, G20, E44, L50

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Article provided by Emerald Group Publishing in its journal Journal of Financial Economic Policy.

Volume (Year): 3 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
Pages: 123-139

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Handle: RePEc:eme:jfeppp:v:3:y:2011:i:2:p:123-139
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  1. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Peter J Klenow, 2008. "Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India," 2008 Meeting Papers 121, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, 04.
  3. Aghion, Philippe & Burgess, Robin & Redding, Stephen J. & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2006. "The Unequal Effects of Liberalization: Evidence from Dismantling the License Raj in India," CEPR Discussion Papers 5492, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
  5. Kalpana Kochhar & Utsav Kumar & Raghuram Rajan & Arvind Subramanian, 2006. "India's Patterns of Development: What Happened, What Follows," NBER Working Papers 12023, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Jeffrey Wurgler, 1999. "Financial Markets And The Allocation Of Capital," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm123, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Mar 2001.
  7. Lawrence Sáez & Joy Yang, 2001. "The Deregulation of State-Owned Enterprises in India and China," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 43(3), pages 69-97, September.
  8. Denis, Diane K. & McConnell, John J., 2003. "International Corporate Governance," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 1-36, March.
  9. Levine, Ross, 1996. "Financial development and economic growth : views and agenda," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1678, The World Bank.
  10. Faccio, Mara & Lang, Larry H. P., 2002. "The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 365-395, September.
  11. Demsetz, Harold & Villalonga, Belen, 2001. "Ownership structure and corporate performance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 209-233, September.
  12. Peter M. DeMarzo & Branko Uro, 2006. "Ownership Dynamics and Asset Pricing with a Large Shareholder," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(4), pages 774-815, August.
  13. Ana M. Fernandes & Ariel Pakes, 2008. "Factor Utilization in Indian Manufacturing: A Look at the World Bank Investment Climate Surveys Data," NBER Working Papers 14178, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Johan E. Eklund & Sameeksha Desai, 2008. "Ownership, Economic Entrenchment and Allocation of Capital," Jena Economic Research Papers 2008-012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  15. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," NBER Working Papers 5554, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Cho, Myeong-Hyeon, 1998. "Ownership structure, investment, and the corporate value: an empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 103-121, January.
  17. P.R. Shukla & Tirthankar Nag & Debashish Biswas, 2005. "Electricity reforms and firm level responses: changing ownership, fuel choices, and technology decisions," International Journal of Global Energy Issues, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 23(2/3), pages 260-279.
  18. Kumbhakar, Subal C & Sarkar, Subrata, 2003. " Deregulation, Ownership, and Productivity Growth in the Banking Industry: Evidence from India," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(3), pages 403-24, June.
  19. Gugler, Klaus & Yurtoglu, Burcin B., 2003. "Average q, marginal q, and the relation between ownership and performance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 379-384, March.
  20. Montek S. Ahluwalia, 2002. "Economic Reforms in India Since 1991: Has Gradualism Worked?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 67-88, Summer.
  21. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December.
  22. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-90, June.
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