IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/reveco/v88y2023icp861-873.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Does managerial ability drive frequent acquisitions? The role of strategic agency, firm innovativeness, and environmental uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Mishra, Chandra S.

Abstract

The strategic agency hypothesis in emerging behavioral theory of the firm suggests that high ability managers have strategic foresight to search distant regions to sense and seize innovative opportunities. Conventional behavioral theory based suggests that managers conduct myopic searches to discover growth opportunities. We test the strategic agency hypothesis in that we investigate the association between strategic managerial ability and the firm's propensity for frequent acquisition using a sample of 5496 firm-year observations over the 2000–2016 period. We find that high strategic ability managers are more likely to pursue frequent acquisitions when the acquirer is innovative and operates in a risky environment. Our results are consistent with the strategic agency hypothesis in that managers with high strategic ability have sufficient strategic foresight to sense and seize growth opportunities via frequent acquisitions in a timely manner.

Suggested Citation

  • Mishra, Chandra S., 2023. "Does managerial ability drive frequent acquisitions? The role of strategic agency, firm innovativeness, and environmental uncertainty," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 861-873.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:88:y:2023:i:c:p:861-873
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2023.07.026
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056023002368
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.iref.2023.07.026?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Renneboog, Luc & Vansteenkiste, Cara, 2019. "Failure and success in mergers and acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 650-699.
    2. Matthew T. Billett & Yiming Qian, 2008. "Are Overconfident CEOs Born or Made? Evidence of Self-Attribution Bias from Frequent Acquirers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(6), pages 1037-1051, June.
    3. Peter Demerjian & Baruch Lev & Sarah McVay, 2012. "Quantifying Managerial Ability: A New Measure and Validity Tests," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(7), pages 1229-1248, July.
    4. Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2002. "Inverse probability weighted M-estimators for sample selection, attrition, and stratification," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer;Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestao, vol. 1(2), pages 117-139, August.
    5. Core, John & Guay, Wayne, 1999. "The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 151-184, December.
    6. Wooldridge, Jeffrey M., 2007. "Inverse probability weighted estimation for general missing data problems," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 141(2), pages 1281-1301, December.
    7. Higgins, Matthew J. & Rodriguez, Daniel, 2006. "The outsourcing of R&D through acquisitions in the pharmaceutical industry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 351-383, May.
    8. Amor, Salma Ben & Kooli, Maher, 2016. "Do acquisitions affect IPO long-run performance? Evidence from single vs. multiple acquirers," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 63-79.
    9. Mishra, Chandra S., 2020. "Are frequent acquirers more entrenched?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    10. Yanhui Wu, 2017. "Incentive Contracts and the Allocation of Talent," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(607), pages 2744-2783.
    11. Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, 2003. "Managing with Style: The Effect of Managers on Firm Policies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(4), pages 1169-1208.
    12. Blundell, Richard & Bond, Stephen, 1998. "Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 115-143, August.
    13. Ismail, Ahmad, 2008. "Which acquirers gain more, single or multiple? Recent evidence from the USA market," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 72-84.
    14. Aktas, Nihat & de Bodt, Eric & Roll, Richard, 2013. "Learning from repetitive acquisitions: Evidence from the time between deals," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(1), pages 99-117.
    15. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Managerial incentives and risk-taking," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 431-468, February.
    16. Windmeijer, Frank, 2005. "A finite sample correction for the variance of linear efficient two-step GMM estimators," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 126(1), pages 25-51, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Du, Kunhai & Zhao, Qicheng & Yin, Yugang & Zhang, Tiancheng, 2024. "Marketing executives and corporate performance: From the perspective of marketing digitalization," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 93(PA), pages 631-644.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chandra S. Mishra, 2020. "Frequent acquirers and management compensation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 41(5), pages 661-694, July.
    2. Mishra, Chandra S., 2020. "Are frequent acquirers more entrenched?," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    3. Chandra S. Mishra, 2023. "Managerial ability and strategic orientation," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 1333-1363, May.
    4. Schriber, Svante & Degischer, Daniel, 2020. "Disentangling acquisition experience: A multilevel analysis and future research agenda," Scandinavian Journal of Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(2).
    5. Huiqi Gan, 2019. "Does CEO managerial ability matter? Evidence from corporate investment efficiency," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 52(4), pages 1085-1118, May.
    6. David Hillier & Patrick McColgan & Athanasios Tsekeris, 2022. "How did the Sarbanes–Oxley Act affect managerial incentives? Evidence from corporate acquisitions," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 1395-1450, May.
    7. Çolak, Gönül & Korkeamäki, Timo, 2021. "CEO mobility and corporate policy risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    8. Blank, D. Brian & Hadley, Brandy, 2021. "When CEOs adapt: An investigation of manager experience, policy and performance following recessions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    9. Bharati, Rakesh & Jia, Jingyi, 2018. "Do bank CEOs really increase risk in vega? Evidence from a dynamic panel GMM specification," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 39-53.
    10. Ng, Joe Cho Yiu & Leung, Charles Ka Yui & Chan, Suikang, 2022. "Corporate Real Estate Holding and Stock Returns: International Evidence from Listed Companies," MPRA Paper 111691, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Shang, Chenguang, 2021. "Dare to play with fire? Managerial ability and the use of short-term debt," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    12. Bharati, Rakesh & Doellman, Thomas & Fu, Xudong, 2016. "CEO confidence and stock returns," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 89-110.
    13. Ziyang Li & Qianwei Ying & Yuying Chen & Xuehui Zhang, 2020. "Managerial risk appetite and asymmetry cost behavior: evidence from China," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(5), pages 4651-4692, December.
    14. Thibaut G. Morillon, 2021. "Serial acquirers and decreasing returns: Do bidders’ acquisition patterns matter?," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 56(3), pages 407-432, August.
    15. An, Suwei, 2023. "Essays on incentive contracts, M&As, and firm risk," Other publications TiSEM dd97d2f5-1c9d-47c5-ba62-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    16. Canace, Thomas G. & Cianci, Anna M. & (Kelvin) Liu, Xiaotao & Tsakumis, George T., 2020. "Paid for looks when others are looking: CEO facial traits, compensation, and corporate visibility," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 85-100.
    17. Chen, Yangyang & Ofosu, Emmanuel & Veeraraghavan, Madhu & Zolotoy, Leon, 2023. "Does CEO overconfidence affect workplace safety?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    18. Efstathios Magerakis & Ahsan Habib, 2022. "Environmental uncertainty and corporate cash holdings: The moderating role of CEO ability," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 22(3), pages 402-432, September.
    19. Ooi, Chai-Aun & Hooy, Chee-Wooi, 2022. "Muslim CEOs, risk-taking and firm performance," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    20. Frank Nagle, 2019. "Open Source Software and Firm Productivity," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(3), pages 1191-1215, March.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:88:y:2023:i:c:p:861-873. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620165 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.