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Exchange rate management when sterilized interventions represent signals of monetary policy

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  • Reeves, Silke Fabian

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  • Reeves, Silke Fabian, 1997. "Exchange rate management when sterilized interventions represent signals of monetary policy," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 339-360.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:6:y:1997:i:4:p:339-360
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    1. Lewis, Karen K., 1995. "Puzzles in international financial markets," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 37, pages 1913-1971, Elsevier.
    2. Bhattacharya, Utpal & Weller, Paul, 1997. "The advantage to hiding one's hand: Speculation and central bank intervention in the foreign exchange market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 251-277, July.
    3. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    4. Kathryn Dominguez and Jeffrey A. Frankel., 1990. "Does Foreign Exchange Intervention Matter? Disentangling the Portfolio and Expectations Effects for the Mark," Economics Working Papers 90-133, University of California at Berkeley.
    5. Cavaglia, Stefano & Verschoor, Willem F. C. & Wolff, Christian C. P., 1993. "Further evidence on exchange rate expectations," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 78-98, February.
    6. Isard,Peter, 1995. "Exchange Rate Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521466004, Enero-Abr.
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    8. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1987. "Reputational constraints on monetary policy," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 141-181, January.
    9. Glick,Reuven & Hutchison,Michael (ed.), 1994. "Exchange Rate Policy and Interdependence," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521461108, Enero-Abr.
    10. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    11. Richard H. Clarida, 1989. "That Trade Deficit, Protectionism and Policy Coordination," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(4), pages 415-438, December.
    12. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Dale W. Henderson, 1991. "Monetary Policy in Interdependent Economies: A Game-Theoretic Approach," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262031787, December.
    13. Michael W. Klein & Eric Rosengren, 1991. "Foreign exchange intervention as a signal of monetary policy," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue May, pages 39-50.
    14. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 280-312, August.
    15. Isard,Peter, 1995. "Exchange Rate Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521460477, Enero-Abr.
    16. Maurice Obstfeld, 1988. "The Effectiveness of Foreign-Exchange Intervention: Recent Experience," NBER Working Papers 2796, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Froot, Kenneth A. & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1995. "Perspectives on PPP and long-run real exchange rates," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 32, pages 1647-1688, Elsevier.
    18. Ghosh, Atish R., 1992. "Is it signalling? Exchange intervention and the dollar-Deutschemark rate," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3-4), pages 201-220, May.
    19. Dominguez, Kathryn Mary, 1990. "Market responses to coordinated central bank intervention," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 121-163, January.
    20. Mr. Mark P. Taylor, 1991. "Intervention, Interest Rates, and Charts: Three Essays in International Finance," IMF Working Papers 1991/106, International Monetary Fund.
    21. Taylor, Dean, 1982. "Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market, or, Bet against the Central Bank," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(2), pages 356-368, April.
    22. Gilles Oudiz & Jeffrey Sachs, 1985. "International Policy Coordination in Dynamic Macroeconomic Models," NBER Chapters, in: International Economic Policy Coordination, pages 274-330, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Ralph C. Bryant & Richard Portes (ed.), 1987. "Global Macroeconomics: Policy Conflict and Cooperation," International Economic Association Series, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-18916-8, December.
    24. Kaminsky, Graciela L. & Lewis, Karen K., 1996. "Does foreign exchange intervention signal future monetary policy?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(2-3), pages 285-312, April.
    25. Klein, Michael W., 1992. "Big effects of small interventions: The informational role of intervention in exchange rate policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 915-924, May.
    26. Hamada, Koichi, 1976. "A Strategic Analysis of Monetary Interdependence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(4), pages 677-700, August.
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    1. Baillie, Richard T. & Humpage, Owen F. & Osterberg, William P., 2000. "Intervention from an information perspective," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 10(3-4), pages 407-421, December.
    2. Yu‐Fu Chen & Michael Funke & Richhild Moessner, 2018. "Informal one‐sided target zone model and the Swiss franc," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(5), pages 1130-1153, November.
    3. Mark P. Taylor & Lucio Sarno, 2001. "Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is It Effective and, If So, How Does It Work?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 839-868, September.
    4. Michael D. Bordo & Owen F. Humpage & Anna J. Schwartz, 2016. "On the Evolution of US Foreign-Exchange-Market Intervention: Thesis, Theory, and Institutions," NBER Chapters, in: Strained Relations: US Foreign-Exchange Operations and Monetary Policy in the Twentieth Century, pages 1-26, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Simwaka, Kisu & Mkandawire, Leslie, 2010. "Official intervention in Foreign Exchange Market in Malawi: A comparison of GARCH and Equilibrium Exchange Rate approaches," MPRA Paper 23111, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Owen F. Humpage, 2003. "Government intervention in the foreign exchange market," Working Papers (Old Series) 0315, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    7. Richard T. Baillie & Owen F. Humpage & William P. Osterberg, 1999. "Intervention as information: a survey," Working Papers (Old Series) 9918, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    8. Kisukyabo Simwaka & Leslie Kwacha Mkandawire, 2004. "The Efficacy of Foreign Exchange Market Intervention in Malawi," Macroeconomics 0407022, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Simwaka, Kisu, 2006. "The effectiveness of official intervention in foreign exchange market in Malawi," MPRA Paper 1123, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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