IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/regeco/v35y2005i6p848-861.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Fiscal competition and regional differentiation

Author

Listed:
  • Justman, Moshe
  • Thisse, Jacques-Francois
  • van Ypersele, Tanguy

Abstract

Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated. Competition between regions over potential investors is then less direct, allowing them to realize greater benefits from external investors. The two polar cases of full and incomplete information about investors' needs are studied. In both cases, there is regional differentiation. However, fiscal competition is efficient in the former case but not in the latter. Finally, it is shown that free entry in the location market calls for some regulation because of the excessive number of competing regions that would prevail in equilibrium.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Justman, Moshe & Thisse, Jacques-Francois & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2005. "Fiscal competition and regional differentiation," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 848-861, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:35:y:2005:i:6:p:848-861
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166-0462(05)00044-X
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles M. Tiebout, 1956. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64, pages 416-416.
    2. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-1056.
    3. Ian King & R. Preston McAfee & Linda Welling, 1993. "Industrial Blackmail: Dynamic Tax Competition and Public Investment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 26(3), pages 590-608, August.
    4. Dennis Epple & Holger Sieg, 1999. "Estimating Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(4), pages 645-681, August.
    5. Justman, Moshe & Thisse, Jacques-Francois & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2002. "Taking the bite out of fiscal competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 294-315, September.
    6. Wildasin, David E., 1988. "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 229-240, March.
    7. Jack High (ed.), 2001. "Competition," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1751, April.
    8. Mansoorian, Arman & Myers, Gordon M., 1997. "On the consequences of government objectives for economies with mobile populations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 265-281, January.
    9. d'Aspremont, C & Gabszewicz, Jean Jaskold & Thisse, J-F, 1979. "On Hotelling's "Stability in Competition"," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1145-1150, September.
    10. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 52(2), pages 269-304, June.
    11. Anderson, S. P. & Neven, D. J., 1989. "Market efficiency with combinable products," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 707-719, April.
    12. Taylor, Leon, 1992. "Infrastructural competition among jurisdictions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 241-259, November.
    13. Martin, Philippe, 1999. "Public policies, regional inequalities and growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 85-105, July.
    14. Jan K. Brueckner, 1999. "Welfare Reform and the Race to the Bottom: Theory and Evidence," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 505-525, January.
    15. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
    16. Emmanuelle Reulier & L. Silveira Costa & I.N. Ogboyi, 2002. "Fiscal competition," Post-Print halshs-00078349, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kai Konrad, 2008. "Mobile tax base as a global common," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(4), pages 395-414, August.
    2. Marcel Gérard & Fernando Ruiz, 2006. "Interjurisdictional Competition for Higher Education and Firms," CESifo Working Paper Series 1719, CESifo Group Munich.
    3. Dembour, Carole & Wauthy, Xavier, 2009. "Investment in public infrastructure with spillovers and tax competition between contiguous regions," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 679-687, November.
    4. Marie-Laure Breuillé & Thierry Madiès & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2007. "Fiscal federalism and soft budget constraint: does the nature of public spending matter?," EconomiX Working Papers 2007-16, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    5. Myrna Wooders & Ben Zissimos, 2003. "Hotelling Tax Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series 932, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Cohen-Zada, Danny & Justman, Moshe, 2012. "Affinity and tension between religious denominations: Evidence from private school enrolment," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(6), pages 950-960.
    7. Hikaru Ogawa, 2010. "Fiscal Competition among Regional Governments - Tax Competition, Expenditure Competition and Externalities -," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 6(1), pages 1-30, February.
    8. repec:gam:jsusta:v:10:y:2018:i:1:p:45-:d:125112 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Marcel Gérard & Natacha Gilson & Fernando Ruiz, 2012. "Higher education and firms: on the interaction between research and regional policies," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(3), pages 338-367, June.
    10. Calfat, Germán & Flôres, R.G. & Rivas, Ana & Granato, M., 2010. "Policy making in asymmetric regional integrations: a methodology for allocating cohesion fund resources," IOB Working Papers 2010.05, Universiteit Antwerpen, Institute of Development Policy (IOB).
    11. Tjaša Bjedov & Thierry Madiès & Marie Claire Villeval, 2016. "Communication And Coordination In A Two-Stage Game," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(3), pages 1519-1540, July.
    12. Zissimos, Ben & Wooders, Myrna, 2008. "Public good differentiation and the intensity of tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1105-1121, June.
    13. Jayet, Hubert & Paty, Sonia, 2006. "Capital indivisibility and tax competition: Are there too many business areas when some of them are empty?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 399-417, November.
    14. Zissimos, Ben & Wooders, Myrna, 2005. "Relaxing Tax Competition through Public Good Differentation," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 737, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    15. C. Dembour, 2008. "Competition for Business Location: A Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 89-111, June.
    16. Justman, Moshe & Thisse, Jacques-Francois & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2002. "Taking the bite out of fiscal competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 294-315, September.
    17. Egger, Hartmut & Falkinger, Josef, 2006. "The role of public infrastructure and subsidies for firm location and international outsourcing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(8), pages 1993-2015, November.
    18. Huang, Wei Hong & Chen, Yang & Rudkin, Simon, 2014. "Dynamic Fiscal competition with public infrastructure investment: Austerity and attracting capital inflow," RIEI Working Papers 2014-03, Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University, Research Institute for Economic Integration, revised 02 Mar 2016.
    19. Patrice Pieretti & Skerdilajda Zanaj & Benteng Zou, 2012. "On the long run economic performance of small economies," CREA Discussion Paper Series 12-14, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R58 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Regional Development Planning and Policy
    • R12 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General Regional Economics - - - Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity; Interregional Trade (economic geography)
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:regeco:v:35:y:2005:i:6:p:848-861. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/regec .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.