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Nothing for something: Marketing cancer drugs to physicians increases prescribing without improving mortality

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  • Carey, Colleen
  • Daly, Michael
  • Li, Jing

Abstract

Physicians commonly receive marketing-related transfers from drug firms. We examine the impact of these relationships on the prescribing of physician-administered cancer drugs in Medicare. We find that prescribing of the associated drug increases 4% in the twelve months after a payment is received, with the increase beginning sharply in the month of payment and fading out within a year. A marketing payment also leads physicians to begin treating cancer patients with lower predicted mortality. While payments result in greater expenditure on cancer drugs, there are no associated improvements in patient mortality.

Suggested Citation

  • Carey, Colleen & Daly, Michael & Li, Jing, 2025. "Nothing for something: Marketing cancer drugs to physicians increases prescribing without improving mortality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 242(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:242:y:2025:i:c:s004727272500009x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2025.105311
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Analysis of health care markets; Information and product quality; Search; Learning;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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