IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/pubeco/v227y2023ics0047272723001792.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Uncovering illegal and underground economies: The case of mafia extortion racketeering

Author

Listed:
  • Piemontese, Lavinia

Abstract

I propose a new approach to quantify the economic cost of hidden economies and apply it to the case of mafia extortion in Northern Italy. To quantify the extortion rate, unobserved in the data, I first show that extortion racketeering is linked to resource misallocation. Then, I implement a structural estimation based on matching the observed misallocation in markets defined as mafia-infiltrated, with that predicted from a model whose parameters are estimated using data on non-mafia markets or calibrated from the literature. The results suggest that the share of output that the mafia extorts from firms ranges between 0.5 and 5 percent of firm-level output for those firms that are subject to extortion, with an implied loss between 0.6 and 8 percent of aggregate value added.

Suggested Citation

  • Piemontese, Lavinia, 2023. "Uncovering illegal and underground economies: The case of mafia extortion racketeering," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 227(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:227:y:2023:i:c:s0047272723001792
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104997
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272723001792
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104997?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Paolo Buonanno & Ruben Durante & Giovanni Prarolo & Paolo Vanin, 2015. "Poor Institutions, Rich Mines: Resource Curse in the Origins of the Sicilian Mafia," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(586), pages 175-202, August.
    2. Hansen, Lars Peter, 1982. "Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimators," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 1029-1054, July.
    3. Timothy Besley & Hannes Mueller, 2018. "Predation, Protection, and Productivity: A Firm-Level Perspective," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 184-221, April.
    4. Paolo Angelini & Andrea Generale, 2008. "On the Evolution of Firm Size Distributions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 426-438, March.
    5. Ranasinghe, Ashantha, 2017. "Property rights, extortion and the misallocation of talent," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 86-110.
    6. McFadden, Daniel, 1989. "A Method of Simulated Moments for Estimation of Discrete Response Models without Numerical Integration," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(5), pages 995-1026, September.
    7. Barone, Guglielmo & Narciso, Gaia, 2015. "Organized crime and business subsidies: Where does the money go?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 98-110.
    8. Nicholas Bloom, 2009. "The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(3), pages 623-685, May.
    9. Balletta, Luigi & Lavezzi, Andrea Mario, 2023. "The economics of extortion: Theory and the case of the Sicilian Mafia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 1109-1141.
    10. Ranasinghe, Ashantha & Restuccia, Diego, 2018. "Financial frictions and the rule of law," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 248-271.
    11. Chang-Tai Hsieh & Peter J. Klenow, 2009. "Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(4), pages 1403-1448.
    12. Litterio Mirenda & Sauro Mocetti & Lucia Rizzica, 2022. "The Economic Effects of Mafia: Firm Level Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(8), pages 2748-2773, August.
    13. Antonio Acconcia & Giancarlo Corsetti & Saverio Simonelli, 2014. "Mafia and Public Spending: Evidence on the Fiscal Multiplier from a Quasi-experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(7), pages 2185-2209, July.
    14. Scognamiglio, Annalisa, 2018. "When the mafia comes to town," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 573-590.
    15. Marco Di Cataldo & Nicola Mastrorocco, 2022. "Organized Crime, Captured Politicians, and the Allocation of Public Resources [“Mafiaand Public Spending: Evidence on the Fiscal Multiplier from a Quasi-Experiment]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 774-839.
    16. Diego Restuccia & Richard Rogerson, 2008. "Policy Distortions and Aggregate Productivity with Heterogeneous Plants," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(4), pages 707-720, October.
    17. Lavinia Piemontese, 2013. "The Spread of Mafia in Northern Italy: The Role of Public Infrastructure," Rivista di Politica Economica, SIPI Spa, issue 4, pages 113-140, October-D.
    18. Galletta, Sergio, 2017. "Law enforcement, municipal budgets and spillover effects: Evidence from a quasi-experiment in Italy," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 90-105.
    19. Eric Bartelsman & John Haltiwanger & Stefano Scarpetta, 2013. "Cross-Country Differences in Productivity: The Role of Allocation and Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 103(1), pages 305-334, February.
    20. Olley, G Steven & Pakes, Ariel, 1996. "The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1263-1297, November.
    21. Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 173-202, November.
    22. Diego Restuccia & Richard Rogerson, 2013. "Misallocation and productivity," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 16(1), pages 1-10, January.
    23. Andrew Atkeson & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2005. "Modeling and Measuring Organization Capital," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(5), pages 1026-1053, October.
    24. Francesco Amodio & Michele Di Maio, 2018. "Making Do With What You Have: Conflict, Input Misallocation and Firm Performance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(615), pages 2559-2612, November.
    25. Paolo Pinotti, 2015. "The Economic Costs of Organised Crime: Evidence from Southern Italy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(586), pages 203-232, August.
    26. Cristiana Donati & Domenico Sarno, 2015. "Are firms in "backward" areas of developed regions more financially constrained? The case of Italian SMEs," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 24(6), pages 1353-1375.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Lavinia Piemontese, 2021. "Uncovering Illegal and Underground Economies: The Case of Mafia Extortion Racketeering," Working Papers halshs-02928546, HAL.
    2. Lavinia Piemontese, 2020. "Uncovering Illegal and Underground Economies: The Case of Mafia Extortion Racketeering," Working Papers 2025, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    3. Di Giorno, Saverio & Dileo, Ivano & Busato, Francesco, 2024. "Shades of grand corruption among allocative efficiency and institutional settings. The case of Italy," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    4. Jung Ho Choi, 2021. "Accrual Accounting and Resource Allocation: A General Equilibrium Analysis," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 1179-1219, September.
    5. Paolo Buonanno & Irene Ferrari & Alessandro Saia, 2023. "ALL IS NOT LOST: Organized Crime and Social Capital Formation," Working Papers 2023: 16, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", revised 2024.
    6. Stefania Fontana & Giorgio d’Agostino, 2024. "Anti-mafia policies and public goods in Italy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 198(3), pages 493-529, March.
    7. Federico Cingano & Marco Tonello, 2020. "Law Enforcement, Social Control and Organized Crime: Evidence from Local Government Dismissals in Italy," Italian Economic Journal: A Continuation of Rivista Italiana degli Economisti and Giornale degli Economisti, Springer;Società Italiana degli Economisti (Italian Economic Association), vol. 6(2), pages 221-254, July.
    8. Marco Di Cataldo & Nicola Mastrorocco, 2022. "Organized Crime, Captured Politicians, and the Allocation of Public Resources [“Mafiaand Public Spending: Evidence on the Fiscal Multiplier from a Quasi-Experiment]," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(3), pages 774-839.
    9. John Asker & Allan Collard-Wexler & Jan De Loecker, 2011. "Productivity volatility and the misallocation of resources in developing economies," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven 507295, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    10. Neira, Julian, 2019. "Bankruptcy and cross-country differences in productivity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 359-381.
    11. Luis Garicano & Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen, 2016. "Firm Size Distortions and the Productivity Distribution: Evidence from France," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(11), pages 3439-3479, November.
    12. Diego Restuccia, 2013. "The Latin American Development Problem: An Interpretation," Economía Journal, The Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association - LACEA, vol. 0(Spring 20), pages 69-108, January.
    13. Bent Christensen & Jesper Bagger, 2014. "Wage and Productivity Dispersion: The Roles of Rent Sharing, Labor Quality and Capital Intensity," 2014 Meeting Papers 473, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    14. Diego Restuccia & Richard Rogerson, 2017. "The Causes and Costs of Misallocation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 151-174, Summer.
    15. Michele Battisti & Filippo Belloc & Massimo Del Gatto, 2020. "Labor Productivity and Firm-Level TFP with Technology-Specific Production Function," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 35, pages 283-300, January.
    16. Bloom, Nicholas & Van Reenen, John, 2011. "Human Resource Management and Productivity," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 19, pages 1697-1767, Elsevier.
    17. Russell W. Cooper & Immo Schott, 2023. "Capital reallocation and the cyclicality of aggregate productivity," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), pages 1337-1365, November.
    18. BAH, Mamadou Mouminy, 2021. "Agglomeration Economies and Labour Misallocation in Cote d’Ivoire," MPRA Paper 109314, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. David, Joel M. & Schmid, Lukas & Zeke, David, 2022. "Risk-adjusted capital allocation and misallocation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(3), pages 684-705.
    20. Maurice Bun & Theoplasti Kolaiti & Tolga Özden, 2023. "Misallocation and Productivity Growth: a Meta-analysis," Working Papers 774, DNB.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Organized crime; Extortion racketeering; Resource misallocation; Welfare loss; Within-industry OP covariance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:227:y:2023:i:c:s0047272723001792. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.