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Testing for tax smoothing in a general equilibrium model of growth

  • Malley, Jim
  • Philippopoulos, Apostolis
  • Economides, George

This paper constructs and formally tests a general equilibrium model of long-term growth and endogenous fiscal policy. In this model policymakers find it optimal to keep the income tax rate constant over time. Tax revenues finance public consumption and public production services, with the latter generating long-term growth. Surprisingly, despite its popularity amongst theorists, there have thus far been no formal econometric tests of this Barro-type general equilibrium model. We find that data from 22 OECD economies uniformly reject this model over the period 1960- 1996.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 18 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 301-315

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:18:y:2002:i:2:p:301-315
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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