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Electoral uncertainty, fiscal policy and macroeconomic fluctuations

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  • Malley, Jim
  • Philippopoulos, Apostolis
  • Woitek, Ulrich

Abstract

In this paper we study the link between elections, fiscal policy and aggregate fluctuations. The set-up is a stylized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model incorporating both technology and political re-election shocks. The later are incorporated via a two-party model with elections. The main theoretical prediction is that forward-looking incumbents, with uncertain prospects of re-election, find it optimal to follow relatively shortsighted fiscal policies, and that this hurts capital accumulation. Our econometric estimation, using U.S. data, finds a statistically significant link between electoral uncertainty and policy instruments and in turn macroeconomic outcomes.
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  • Malley, Jim & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Woitek, Ulrich, 2007. "Electoral uncertainty, fiscal policy and macroeconomic fluctuations," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 1051-1080, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:31:y:2007:i:3:p:1051-1080
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    Cited by:

    1. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & George Economides, 2008. "Fiscal policy, rent seeking, and growth under electoral uncertainty: theory and evidence from the OECD," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 41(4), pages 1375-1405, November.
    2. Economides, George & Park, Hyun & Philippopoulos, Apostolis, 2011. "How Should The Government Allocate Its Tax Revenues Between Productivity-Enhancing And Utility-Enhancing Public Goods?," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(03), pages 336-364, June.
    3. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & James Malley & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2012. "Tax structure, growth, and welfare in the UK," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(2), pages 237-258, April.
    4. Vasilev, Aleksandar, 2013. "Fiscal policy in a Real-Business-Cycle model with labor-intensive government services and endogenous public sector wages and hours," EconStor Preprints 142338, ZBW - German National Library of Economics.
    5. Andrei S. Akhremenko & Alexander P. Petrov & Egor A. Yureskul, 2015. "Cyclically Balanced Growth Paths in a Model of Economic Growth with Endogenous Policy Switching," HSE Working papers WP BRP 109/EC/2015, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    6. Peter N. Ireland, 2007. "Changes in the Federal Reserve's Inflation Target: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(8), pages 1851-1882, December.
    7. Jim Malley & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Ulrich Woitek, 2007. "To React or Not? Fiscal Policy, Volatility and Welfare in the EU-3," IEW - Working Papers 312, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    8. Niemann, Stefan, 2011. "Dynamic monetary–fiscal interactions and the role of monetary conservatism," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 234-247.
    9. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Vanghelis Vassilatos, 2007. "Rent-seeking competition from state coffers in a calibrated DSGE model of the euro area," Working Papers 2007_29, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    10. Peter N. Ireland, 2009. "On the Welfare Cost of Inflation and the Recent Behavior of Money Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 1040-1052, June.
    11. Margarita Katsimi & Vassilis Sarantides, 2012. "Do elections affect the composition of fiscal policy in developed, established democracies?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 325-362, April.
    12. Stefan Niemann & Paul Pichler & Gerhard Sorger, 2013. "Central Bank Independence And The Monetary Instrument Problem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 54, pages 1031-1055, August.
    13. Goodell, John W. & Vähämaa, Sami, 2013. "US presidential elections and implied volatility: The role of political uncertainty," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 1108-1117.
    14. J. Stephen Ferris & Stanley L. Winer, 2006. "Politics, political competition and the political budget cycle in Canada, 1870 - 2000: a search across alternative fiscal instruments," Carleton Economic Papers 06-05, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    15. Verstyuk Sergey, "undated". "Electoral cycles in Ukraine," EERC Working Paper Series 02-209e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    16. Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Jim Malley & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2007. "Public Education Expenditure, Growth and Welfare," Working Papers 2007_09, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    17. Peter Ireland & Scott Schuh, 2008. "Productivity and U.S. Macroeconomic Performance: Interpreting the Past and Predicting the Future with a Two-Sector Real Business Cycle Model," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(3), pages 473-492, July.
    18. Duha T. Altindag & Naci Mocan, 2015. "Mobile Politicians: Opportunistic Career Moves and Moral Hazard," NBER Working Papers 21438, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Niklas Potrafke, 2006. "Political Effects on the Allocation of Public Expenditures: Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 653, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    20. Margarita Katsimi & Vassilis Sarantides, 2010. "Do Elections Affect the Composition of Fiscal Policy?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2908, CESifo Group Munich.
    21. George Economides & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Simon Price, 2002. "Elections, Fiscal Policy and Growth: Revisiting the Mechanism," CESifo Working Paper Series 691, CESifo Group Munich.
    22. Vasilev, Aleksandar, 2013. "Essays on Real Business Cycle Modeling and the Public Sector," EconStor Theses, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, number 130522.
    23. Lee, Jiho, 2012. "Are structural parameters of DSGE models stable in Korea?," Journal of Asian Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 50-59.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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