IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/athebu/110.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Is Tax Policy Coordination Necessary?

Author

Listed:
  • Kollintzas, T.
  • Philippopoulos, A.
  • Vasillatos, V.

Abstract

The answer to this question is "yes". We examine noncooperative and cooperative equilibria under perfect capital mobility. To this end, we develop a two-country optimal growth model with endogenous national fiscal policies. The channel for interdependence is distortionary income taxes.

Suggested Citation

  • Kollintzas, T. & Philippopoulos, A. & Vasillatos, V., 1999. "Is Tax Policy Coordination Necessary?," Athens University of Economics and Business 110, Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:athebu:110
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kehoe, Patrick J., 1987. "Coordination of fiscal policies in a world economy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 349-376, May.
    2. Branson, William H. & Henderson, Dale W., 1985. "The specification and influence of asset markets," Handbook of International Economics, in: R. W. Jones & P. B. Kenen (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 749-805, Elsevier.
    3. Jacob Frenkel & Assaf Razin & Efraim Sadka, 1991. "International Taxation in an Integrated World," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061430.
    4. Razin, Assaf & Sadka, Efraim, 1991. "International tax competition and gains from tax harmonization," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 69-76, September.
    5. Francesco Giavazzi & Marco Pagano, 1991. "The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility," NBER Chapters, in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 303-330, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1992. "The Politics of 1992: Fiscal Policy and European Integration," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 689-701.
    7. Obstfeld, Maurice, 1991. "A model of currency depreciation and the debt-inflation spiral," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 151-177.
    8. Stokey, Nancy L., 1991. "Credible public policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 627-656, October.
    9. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-971, October.
    10. Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1990. "International Coordination of Fiscal Policy in Limiting Economies," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(3), pages 617-636, June.
    11. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 623-646, May.
    12. Chari, V V & Kehoe, Patrick J, 1990. "Sustainable Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(4), pages 783-802, August.
    13. Kollintzas, T. Philippopoulos, A. & Vasillatos, V., 1999. "Normative Aspects of Fiscal Policy in an Economic Union: a Theoretical Review," Athens University of Economics and Business 109, Athens University of Economics and Business, Department of International and European Economic Studies.
    14. Assaf Razin & Chi-Wa Yuen, 1999. "Optimal International Taxation and Growth Rate Convergence: Tax Competition vs. Coordination," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 6(1), pages 61-78, February.
    15. Chamley, Christophe, 1986. "Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equilibrium with Infinite Lives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 607-622, May.
    16. Patrick J. Kehoe, 1989. "Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May Be Undesirable," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 56(2), pages 289-296.
    17. Kollintzas, Tryphon & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 1999. "Normative Aspects of Fiscal Policy in an Economic Union: a Review," CEPR Discussion Papers 2212, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    18. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Frode Brevik & Manfred Gärtner, 2006. "Macroeconomic effects of banking secrecy when tax evasion is endogenous," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2006 2006-10, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    2. Frode Brevik & Manfred Gärtner, 2008. "Can tax evasion tame Leviathan governments?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 103-122, July.
    3. Malley, Jim & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Economides, George, 2002. "Testing for tax smoothing in a general equilibrium model of growth," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-315, June.
    4. Jim Malley & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 1999. "A note on testing for tax-smoothing in general equilibrium," Working Papers 1999_17, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
    5. Jim Malley & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 1999. "Economic Growth And Endogenous Fiscal Policy: In Search Of A Data Consistent General Equilibrium Model," Working Papers 1999_18, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Jan 1998.
    6. Frode Brevik & Manfred Gärtner, 2005. "Welfare and Distribution Effects of Bank Secrecy Laws," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2005 2005-07, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    7. George Economides & Apostolis Philippopoulos & Simon Price, 2002. "Elections, Fiscal Policy and Growth: Revisiting the Mechanism," CESifo Working Paper Series 691, CESifo.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kollintzas, Tryphon & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 1999. "Normative Aspects of Fiscal Policy in an Economic Union: a Review," CEPR Discussion Papers 2212, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. F. Van der Ploeg, 1992. "Coordinación de políticas macroeconómicas en las diferentes etapas de la integración económica y monetaria en Europa," EKONOMIAZ. Revista vasca de Economía, Gobierno Vasco / Eusko Jaurlaritza / Basque Government, vol. 24(03), pages 240-286.
    3. Maurice Obstfeld, 1989. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," NBER Working Papers 2869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Enrique G. Mendoza & Linda L. Tesar, 1995. "Supply-Side Economics in a Global Economy," NBER Working Papers 5086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
    6. Benhabib, Jess & Rustichini, Aldo, 1997. "Optimal Taxes without Commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 231-259, December.
    7. Willem H. Buiter & Anne C. Sibert, 2003. "Cross-Border Tax Externalities: Are Budget Deficits too Small?," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000430, UCLA Department of Economics.
    8. Buiter, Willem H. & Sibert, Anne C., 2016. "Government deficits in large open economies: The problem of too little public debt," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), vol. 10, pages 1-39.
    9. Andrew Atkeson & V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 1999. "Taxing capital income: a bad idea," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, vol. 23(Sum), pages 3-17.
    10. Oscar Mauricio VALENCIA ARANA, 2006. "Imperfect Government Insurance and Treasury Securities Markets," Archivos de Economía 002814, Departamento Nacional de Planeación.
    11. Kollintzas, T. Philippopoulos, A. & Vasillatos, V., 1999. "Normative Aspects of Fiscal Policy in an Economic Union: a Theoretical Review," DEOS Working Papers 109, Athens University of Economics and Business.
    12. Filippo Occhino, 2005. "Optimal Fiscal Policy over the Business Cycle," Departmental Working Papers 200502, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    13. Chari, V.V. & Kehoe, Patrick J., 1999. "Optimal fiscal and monetary policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 26, pages 1671-1745, Elsevier.
    14. Andres Velasco, 1996. "When Are Fixed Exchange Rates Really Fixed?," NBER Working Papers 5842, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Hannu Piekkola, 1995. "Capital income taxation, tax criteria, and intergenerational welfare," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 62(3), pages 295-322, October.
    16. Malley, Jim & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Economides, George, 2002. "Testing for tax smoothing in a general equilibrium model of growth," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-315, June.
    17. Chang, Roberto, 1998. "Credible Monetary Policy in an Infinite Horizon Model: Recursive Approaches," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 431-461, August.
    18. Christopher Phelan & Ennio Stacchetti, 2001. "Sequential Equilibria in a Ramsey Tax Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1491-1518, November.
    19. Michael D. Bordo & Finn E. Kydland, 1990. "The Gold Standard as a Rule," NBER Working Papers 3367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Velasco, Andres, 1997. "When are fixed exchange rates really fixed?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 5-25, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    TAXATION ; FISCAL POLICY ; ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:athebu:110. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: . General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/auebugr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Krichel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/auebugr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.