Public Capital and Optimal Taxes Without Commitment
Download full text from publisher
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Salvador Ortigueira, 1999. "Equilibrium Indeterminacy in an Endogenous Growth Model: Debt as a Coordination Device," Working Papers 9901, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- Malley, Jim & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Economides, George, 2002.
"Testing for tax smoothing in a general equilibrium model of growth,"
European Journal of Political Economy,
Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-315, June.
- Jim Malley & Apostolis Philippopoulos & George Economides, 1999. "Testing For Tax Smoothing In A General Equilibrium Model Of Growth," Working Papers 1999_22, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- Park, Hyun & Philippopoulos, Apostolis, 2004. "Indeterminacy and fiscal policies in a growing economy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 645-660, January.
- George Economides & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2003. "Are Nash Tax Rates too Low or Too High? The Role of Endogenous Growth in Models with Public Goods," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(1), pages 37-53, January.
- Velasco, Andres, 1997. "When are fixed exchange rates really fixed?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 5-25, October.
- Ambler, Steve, 1999.
"Les modèles à agent représentatif et la politique de taxation optimale,"
Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(4), pages 539-557, décembre.
- Steve Ambler, 1999. "Les modèles à agent représentatif et la politique de taxation optimale," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 91, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
More about this item
KeywordsCAPITAL; TAXES; TAXATION;
- D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cvs:starer:96-19. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Anne Stubing). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aenyuus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.