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Nonlinear analysis of the cooperation of strategic alliances through stochastic catastrophe theory

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  • Xu, Yan
  • Hu, Bin
  • Wu, Jiang
  • Zhang, Jianhua

Abstract

The excitation intervention of strategic alliance may change with the changes in the parameters of circumstance (e.g., external alliance tasks). As a result, the stable cooperation between members may suffer a complete unplanned betrayal at last. However, current perspectives on strategic alliances cannot adequately explain this transition mechanism. This study is a first attempt to analyze this nonlinear phenomenon through stochastic catastrophe theory (SCT). A stochastic dynamics model is constructed based on the cooperation of strategic alliance from the perspective of evolutionary game theory. SCT explains the discontinuous changes caused by the changes in environmental parameters. Theoretically, we identify conditions where catastrophe can occur in the cooperation of alliance members.

Suggested Citation

  • Xu, Yan & Hu, Bin & Wu, Jiang & Zhang, Jianhua, 2014. "Nonlinear analysis of the cooperation of strategic alliances through stochastic catastrophe theory," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 400(C), pages 100-108.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:400:y:2014:i:c:p:100-108
    DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2014.01.004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ahmad Makui & Seyed Mohammad Seyedhosseini & Seyed Jafar Sadjadi & Parinaz Esmaeili, 2020. "Analysis of labor strike based on evolutionary game and catastrophe theory," EURO Journal on Decision Processes, Springer;EURO - The Association of European Operational Research Societies, vol. 8(1), pages 79-88, May.

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