IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/soceco/v107y2023ics2214804323001258.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cooperation in two-player social dilemmas with other-regarding orientations

Author

Listed:
  • Płatkowski, Tadeusz

Abstract

We present a unified description of the influence of other-regarding orientations (ORO) on the evolution of cooperation and social tensions in all basic classes of two-person social dilemmas. We provide analytical conditions for which two types of ORO, the minimum payoff orientation and the total payoff orientation lead to full cooperation between players. It turns out that in many popular social dilemmas both types of ORO are necessary to promote cooperation, and the minimum payoff orientation may have advantage over the total payoff orientation. Moreover, ORO can be more effective in fostering cooperation in more challenging social dilemmas. For the dilemma games for which the initial and modified through ORO payoff matrices have mixed Nash equilibria we prove that ORO fosters cooperation. Once a real life situation is identified as a particular type of social dilemma in which the pro-social behavior is determined by material payoffs, our results determine the choice of the type and of the intensity of ORO necessary to foster cooperation and to erase social tensions between players.

Suggested Citation

  • Płatkowski, Tadeusz, 2023. "Cooperation in two-player social dilemmas with other-regarding orientations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 107(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:107:y:2023:i:c:s2214804323001258
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102099
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2214804323001258
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.socec.2023.102099?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:107:y:2023:i:c:s2214804323001258. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620175 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.