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Technological change in water use: A mean-field game approach to optimal investment timing

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  • Bouveret, Géraldine
  • Dumitrescu, Roxana
  • Tankov, Peter

Abstract

The need for clean water is expected to substantially increase while further reductions of water availability in sufficient quantity and quality are projected owing to climate change and anthropogenic activities. Accordingly, the debate on water security has recently intensified and reached the intergovernmental arena. Industry is, in particular, one of the largest (non-consumptive) water users, accountable for massive toxic wastewater discharges and facing stringent and costly environmental oversight. However, the management of reservoirs is intricate and operational research must be further expanded to design tools that enhance water security while improving operators’ profitability.

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  • Bouveret, Géraldine & Dumitrescu, Roxana & Tankov, Peter, 2022. "Technological change in water use: A mean-field game approach to optimal investment timing," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 9(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:oprepe:v:9:y:2022:i:c:s2214716022000045
    DOI: 10.1016/j.orp.2022.100225
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    1. Ren'e Aid & Xiangying Pang & Xiaolu Tan, 2025. "Exit Incentives for Carbon Emissive Firms," Papers 2505.04301, arXiv.org.

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