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Match rigging and the career concerns of referees

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  • Boeri, Tito
  • Severgnini, Battista

Abstract

This paper contributes to the literature on career concerns and corruption by drawing on extensive information on the performance of referees and records from Calciopoli, a judicial inquiry carried out in 2006 on corruption in the Italian football league. Unlike previous studies, we can analyse in detail the assignment of the referees to the most important matches, which is an important step in their career. Moreover, we can relate this choice to the performance of referees in previous matches and the evaluations they received in this context. We find that referees involved in match rigging were promoted to top games and that their evaluation was not negatively affected by their involvement in documented episodes of match rigging.

Suggested Citation

  • Boeri, Tito & Severgnini, Battista, 2011. "Match rigging and the career concerns of referees," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 349-359, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:labeco:v:18:y:2011:i:3:p:349-359
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Mueller-Langer Frank & Andreoli-Versbach Patrick, 2017. "Leading-Effect, Risk-Taking and Sabotage in Two-Stage Tournaments: Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 237(1), pages 1-28, February.
    2. Tito Boeri & Battista Severgnini, 2014. "The decline of professional football in Italy," Chapters, in: John Goddard & Peter Sloane (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Professional Football, chapter 19, pages 322-335, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Christian Deutscher & Eugen Dimant & Brad R. Humphreys, 2017. "Match Fixing and Sports Betting in Football: Empirical Evidence from the German Bundesliga," Working Papers 17-01, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    4. Babatunde Buraimo & Giuseppe Migali & Robert Simmons, 2016. "An Analysis of Consumer Response to Corruption: Italy's Calciopoli Scandal," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 78(1), pages 22-41, February.
    5. Michael J. Lopez, 2016. "Persuaded Under Pressure: Evidence From The National Football League," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(4), pages 1763-1773, October.
    6. Thomas Dohmen & Jan Sauermann, 2016. "Referee Bias," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(4), pages 679-695, September.
    7. Barry Reilly & Robert Witt, 2016. "Disciplinary Sanction and Social Pressure in English Premiership Soccer," Working Paper Series 8816, Department of Economics, University of Sussex.
    8. Fiona Carmichael & Giambattista Rossi & Denis Thomas, 2017. "Production, Efficiency, and Corruption in Italian Serie A Football," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 18(1), pages 34-57, January.
    9. John K. Wilson & Richard Pomfret, 2014. "Public Policy and Professional Sports," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15381.
    10. Alessandro Innocenti & Tommaso Nannicini & Roberto Ricciuti, 2021. "The Importance of Betting Early," Risks, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-15, April.
    11. Babatunde Buraimo & Giuseppe Migali & Robert Simmons, 2014. "An analysis of consumer response to corruption," Working Papers 64473209, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    12. Andrews, Matt & Harrington, Peter, 2016. "Off Pitch: Football's Financial Integrity Weaknesses, and How to Strengthen Them," Working Paper Series 16-009, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    13. Monika Frenger & Eike Emrich & Werner Pitsch, 2019. "Corruption in Olympic Sports: Prevalence Estimations of Match Fixing Among German Squad Athletes," SAGE Open, , vol. 9(3), pages 21582440198, July.

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