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An analysis of consumer response to corruption

Author

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  • Babatunde Buraimo
  • Giuseppe Migali
  • Robert Simmons

Abstract

The literature on economics of corruption is lacking in evidence on consumer responses to identifiable scandals. The Calciopoli episode affecting Italian football in the 2005/06 season serves as an opportunity for an empirical investigation into consumer (fan) behaviour following punishments imposed by the Italian league on clubs whose officials were found guilty of corrupt practices. Using a difference-in-difference estimation method, where the convicted teams are the treatment group, we find that home attendances for treated teams fell by around 16%, relative to control group teams defined as those clubs not subject to league-imposed punishment. We show further that the fall in attendances identified with Calciopoli punishment resulted in non-trivial gate revenue reductions. Our results suggest that a sizeable number of fans of the punished clubs were subsequently deterred from supporting their teams inside the stadium. We explore alternative explanations of this adverse fan response.

Suggested Citation

  • Babatunde Buraimo & Giuseppe Migali & Robert Simmons, 2014. "An analysis of consumer response to corruption," Working Papers 64473209, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:lan:wpaper:64473209
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Buraimo, Babatunde & Simmons, Rob, 2009. "A tale of two audiences: Spectators, television viewers and outcome uncertainty in Spanish football," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 326-338, July.
    4. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2008. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 123(2), pages 703-745.
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    8. David Forrest & Rob Simmons, 2006. "New Issues in Attendance Demand," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 7(3), pages 247-266, August.
    9. Toke S. Aidt, 2003. "Economic analysis of corruption: a survey," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(491), pages 632-652, November.
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    12. Ferraz, Claudio & Finan, Fred S., 2006. "Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9tq6q0qn, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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    Cited by:

    1. David Forrest, 2014. "Football and betting," Chapters, in: John Goddard & Peter Sloane (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Professional Football, chapter 23, pages 383-400, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Tito Boeri & Battista Severgnini, 2014. "The decline of professional football in Italy," Chapters, in: John Goddard & Peter Sloane (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Professional Football, chapter 19, pages 322-335, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. James Reade, 2014. "Detecting corruption in football," Chapters, in: John Goddard & Peter Sloane (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Professional Football, chapter 25, pages 419-446, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Raul Caruso & Marco Di Domizio & Domenico Rossignoli, 2017. "Aggregate wages of players and performance in Italian Serie A," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 34(3), pages 515-531, December.
    5. John Goddard & Peter Sloane (ed.), 2014. "Handbook on the Economics of Professional Football," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14821, March.

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