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Firm-sponsored general education and mobility frictions: Evidence from hospital sponsorship of nursing schools and faculty

  • Benson, Alan

This study asks why hospitals provide direct financial support to nursing schools and faculty. This support is striking because nursing education is clearly general, clearly paid by the firm, and information asymmetries appear minimal. Using AHA and survey data, I find hospitals employing a greater share of their MSA's registered nurses are more likely to provide direct financial support to nursing schools and faculty, net of size and other institutional controls. Given the institutional context, I interpret this result as unusually specific evidence that technologically general skill training may be made de facto-specific by imperfect and costly mobility.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016762961200118X
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 32 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 149-159

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:32:y:2013:i:1:p:149-159
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2012.09.002
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560

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