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Contracts and purchaser-provider relationships in community care

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  • Forder, Julien

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  • Forder, Julien, 1997. "Contracts and purchaser-provider relationships in community care," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 517-542, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:16:y:1997:i:5:p:517-542
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    1. Baron, David P., 1989. "Design of regulatory mechanisms and institutions," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 24, pages 1347-1447, Elsevier.
    2. B. Caillaud & R. Guesnerie & P. Rey & J. Tirole, 1988. "Government Intervention in Production and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    3. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    4. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
    5. Hammond, Peter J, 1990. "Theoretical Progress in Public Economics: A Provocative Assessment," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 42(1), pages 6-33, January.
    6. David P. Baron, 1988. "Regulation and Legislative Choice," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 467-477, Autumn.
    7. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1994. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1125-1156.
    8. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    9. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
    10. Kreps, David M., 1990. "Game Theory and Economic Modelling," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198283812, Decembrie.
    11. Melumad, Nahum D. & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1989. "Value of communication in agencies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 334-368, April.
    12. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Julien Forder & Ann Netten, 2000. "The price of placements in residential and nursing home care: the effects of contracts and competition," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(7), pages 643-657, October.
    2. Bech, Mickael & Christiansen, Terkel & Dunham, Kelly & Lauridsen, Jørgen & Lyttkens, Carl Hampus & McDonald, Kathryn & McGuire, Alistair & TECH investigators, the, 2006. "How do economic incentives and regulatory factors influence adoption of cardiac technologies? Result from the TECH project," Working Papers 2006:15, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    3. Forder, Julien, 2000. "Mental health: market power and governance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 877-905, November.

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