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Oscillating currents : The changing rationale for government intervention in the electricity industry

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  • Jaccard, Mark

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  • Jaccard, Mark, 1995. "Oscillating currents : The changing rationale for government intervention in the electricity industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(7), pages 579-592, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:enepol:v:23:y:1995:i:7:p:579-592
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    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Paul L. Joskow & Donald B. Marron, 1992. "What Does a Negawatt Really Cost? Evidence from Utility Conservation Programs," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 41-74.
    3. Ronald J. Sutherland, 1991. "Market Barriers to Energy-Efficiency Investments," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 3), pages 15-34.
    4. Paul L. Joskow, 1987. "Productivity Growth and Technical Change in the Generation of Electricity," The Energy Journal, , vol. 8(1), pages 17-38, July.
    5. Hempling, Scott, 1994. "Depolarizing the debate: Can retail wheeling co-exist with integrated resource planning?," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 24-33, April.
    6. Joskow, Paul L, 1974. "Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 291-327, October.
    7. Fisher, Anthony C. & Rothkopf, Michael H., 1989. "Market failure and energy policy A rationale for selective conservation," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 397-406, August.
    8. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    9. Ruff, Larry E., 1994. "Stop wheeling and start dealing: Resolving the transmission dilemma," The Electricity Journal, Elsevier, vol. 7(5), pages 24-43, June.
    10. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    11. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116, December.
    12. De Paoli, Luigi & Finon, Dominique, 1993. "Implications of Community policy for the electricity industries," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 209-221, July.
    13. Tenenbaum, Bernard & Lock, Reinier & Barker, Jim, 1992. "Electricity privatization structural, competitive and regulatory options," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 20(12), pages 1134-1160, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gorini de Oliveira, Ricardo & Tolmasquim, Mauricio Tiomno, 2004. "Regulatory performance analysis case study: Britain's electricity industry," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(11), pages 1261-1276, July.

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