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The incentive effects of the overlapping project structure in credit markets

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  • Niinimäki, J.-P.

Abstract

In this theoretical paper, we examine the risk-shifting problem between lenders and a firm running projects in two different environments. In a synchronous environment, the firm introduces two new 2-period projects that both begin and end on the same date and hence have a new start date in odd-numbered periods. In an asynchronous environment, the firm introduces one new 2-period project in every period: This process creates an overlapping structure for the projects. We show that the set of parameters that allow for reputation-supported lending is larger if projects are asynchronous rather than synchronous. The findings can be generalized to other forms of moral hazard.

Suggested Citation

  • Niinimäki, J.-P., 2024. "The incentive effects of the overlapping project structure in credit markets," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jebusi:v:128:y:2024:i:c:s0148619524000018
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2024.106159
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Credit rationing; Dynamic moral hazard; Staged financing; Reputation; Risk-shifting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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