Entrepreneurs, Legal Institutions and Firm Dynamics
This paper assesses quantitatively the impact of legal institutions on entrepreneurial firm dynamics. Owners choose firm size, financial structure and default to manage risk. We find: (i) Less risk averse entrepreneurs run bigger firms and it is optimal for them to incorporate, while more risk averse entrepreneurs run smaller firms and generally are better off remaining unincorporated. (ii) More risk-averse owners tend to default more often than the less risk averse, though they carry less debt. (iii) The model estimates a credit constraint, which binds for many but not all entrepreneurs and matches bank lending criteria. The model also finds modest differences in owner risk aversion, consistent with micro studies.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Date of revision:|
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- Galina Vereshchagina & Hugo A. Hopenhayn, 2009.
"Risk Taking by Entrepreneurs,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1808-30, December.
- Glenn W Harrison & John A List & Charles Towe, 2007.
"Naturally Occurring Preferences and Exogenous Laboratory Experiments: A Case Study of Risk Aversion,"
Econometric Society, vol. 75(2), pages 433-458, 03.
- Charles Towe & Glenn Harrison & John List, 2004. "Naturally occurring preferences and exogenous laboratory experiments: A case study of risk aversion," Framed Field Experiments 00155, The Field Experiments Website.
- Antunes, António & Cavalcanti, Tiago & Villamil, Anne, 2008. "The effect of financial repression and enforcement on entrepreneurship and economic development," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 278-297, March.
- Boissay, Frédéric & Gropp, Reint, 2007.
"Trade credit defaults and liquidity provision by firms,"
Working Paper Series
0753, European Central Bank.
- Frederic Boissay & Reint Gropp, 2007. "Trade Credit Defaults and Liquidity Provision by Firms," Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting 179, Department of Finance, Goethe University Frankfurt am Main.
- Stefan Krasa & Tridib Sharma & Anne Villamil, 2008. "Bankruptcy and firm finance," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(2), pages 239-266, August.
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