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An experiment on sequential rent-seeking

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  • Weimann, Joachim
  • Yang, Chun-Lei
  • Vogt, Carsten

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  • Weimann, Joachim & Yang, Chun-Lei & Vogt, Carsten, 2000. "An experiment on sequential rent-seeking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 405-426, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:41:y:2000:i:4:p:405-426
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    2. Berg Joyce & Dickhaut John & McCabe Kevin, 1995. "Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 122-142, July.
    3. Vogt, Carsten & Weimann, Joachim & Yang, Chun-Lei, 2002. "Efficient Rent-Seeking in Experiment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(1-2), pages 67-78, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Yasuyo Hamaguchi & Satoshi Mitani & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2003. "Does the Varian Mechanism Work?--Emissions Trading as an Example," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 2(2), pages 85-96, August.
    2. Jae Wook Yoo & Richard Reed & Shung Jae Shin & David J. Lemak, 2009. "Strategic Choice and Performance in Late Movers: Influence of the Top Management Team's External Ties," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 308-335, March.
    3. Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock & Roman Sheremeta, 2015. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(4), pages 609-669, December.
    4. Stracke, Rudi & Hörtnagl, Tanja & Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 2016. "Competing for Market Shares: Why the Order of Moves Matters Even When It Shouldn't," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145532, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    5. Klaus Abbink & Jordi Brandts, 2016. "Political autonomy and independence: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 28(3), pages 461-496, July.
    6. Eisenkopf, Gerald & Friehe, Tim, 2014. "Stop watching and start listening! The impact of coaching and peer observation in tournaments," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 56-70.
    7. Klaus Abbink & David Masclet & Daniel Mirza, 2012. "Inequality and Inter-group Conflicts – Experimental Evidence," Economics Working Paper from Condorcet Center for political Economy at CREM-CNRS 2012-07-ccr, Condorcet Center for political Economy.
    8. Robin Chark & Amnon Rapoport & Rami Zwick, 2011. "Experimental comparison of two multiple-stage contest designs with asymmetric players," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 305-329, June.
    9. Daniel Houser & Thomas Stratmann, 2012. "Gordon Tullock and experimental economics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 211-222, July.
    10. Guth, Werner & Muller, Wieland & Spiegel, Yossi, 2006. "Noisy leadership: An experimental approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 37-62, October.
    11. Philip Brookins & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2014. "An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 245-261, June.
    12. Benedikt Herrmann & Henrik Orzen, 2008. "The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking," Discussion Papers 2008-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    13. Miguel A. Fonseca, 2006. "It's not how you play the game, it's winning that matters: an experimental investigation of asymmetric contests," DOCUMENTOS DE CERAC 002927, CERAC -CENTRO DE RECURSOS PARA EL ANÁLISIS DE CONFLICTOS-.
    14. Kwiatkowski, Andrzej, 2010. "Affirmative Action Policy and Effort Levels. Sequential-Move Contest Game Argument," SIRE Discussion Papers 2010-83, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    15. Fonseca, Miguel A., 2009. "An experimental investigation of asymmetric contests," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 582-591, September.
    16. Jost, Peter-J. & Kräkel, Matthias, 2008. "Human capital investments in asymmetric corporate tournaments," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 312-331.
    17. Arthur J.H.C. Schram, 2002. "Experimental Public Choice," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-106/1, Tinbergen Institute.

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