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Does the Varian Mechanism Work?--Emissions Trading as an Example

  • Yasuyo Hamaguchi

    (Faculty of Economics, Kyoto sangyo University, Japan)

  • Satoshi Mitani

    (Matsui Securities Co., Ltd., Japan)

  • Tatsuyoshi Saijo

    (Institute of social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Japan)

This paper investigates whether Varian's(1994) compensation mechanism can work in a laboratory. The results show that this mechanism does not work as in the theory. We found that the magnitude of penalties crucially affects subjects' behavior.

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Article provided by College of Business, and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan in its journal International Journal of Business and Economics.

Volume (Year): 2 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 85-96

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Handle: RePEc:ijb:journl:v:2:y:2003:i:2:p:85-96
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  1. Yan Chen & Robert Gazzale, 2004. "When Does Learning in Games Generate Convergence to Nash Equilibria? The Role of Supermodularity in an Experimental Setting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1505-1535, December.
  2. Varian, Hal R, 1994. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities When Agents Are Well-Informed," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(5), pages 1278-93, December.
  3. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-55, December.
  4. Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
  5. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
  6. Hahn, Robert W, 1984. "Market Power and Transferable Property Rights," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 99(4), pages 753-65, November.
  7. Harrison, Glenn W, 1989. "Theory and Misbehavior of First-Price Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(4), pages 749-62, September.
  8. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March.
  9. Misiolek, Walter S. & Elder, Harold W., 1989. "Exclusionary manipulation of markets for pollution rights," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 156-166, March.
  10. Weimann, Joachim & Yang, Chun-Lei & Vogt, Carsten, 2000. "An experiment on sequential rent-seeking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 41(4), pages 405-426, April.
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