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Yasuyo Hamaguchi

Personal Details

First Name:Yasuyo
Middle Name:
Last Name:Hamaguchi
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pha1001

Affiliation

Faculty of Economics
Nagoya City University

Nagoya, Japan
http://www.econ.nagoya-cu.ac.jp/
RePEc:edi:fengcjp (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Yasuyo Hamaguchi & Toshiji Kawagoe, 2005. "An Experimental Study of Leniency Programs," Discussion papers 05003, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  2. Yasuyo Hamaguchi & Satoshi Mitani & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2004. "Does the Varian Mechanism Work? -Emissions Trading as an Example," Discussion papers 04009, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
  3. C. Bram Cadsby & Yasuyo Hamaguchi & Toshiji KawagoeAuthor-Name: & Elizabeth Maynes, 2001. "Gender and Culture in a Threshold Public Goods Game: Japan versus Canada," ISER Discussion Paper 0540, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  4. Hirota, S. & Saijo, T. & Hamaguchi, Y. & Kawagoe, T., 2000. "Does the Free-rider Problem Occur in Corporate Takeovers? Evidence from Laboratory Markets," ISER Discussion Paper 0512, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

Articles

  1. Hamaguchi, Yasuyo & Kawagoe, Toshiji & Shibata, Aiko, 2009. "Group size effects on cartel formation and the enforcement power of leniency programs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 145-165, March.
  2. Bram Cadsby, C. & Hamaguchi, Yasuyo & Kawagoe, Toshiji & Maynes, Elizabeth & Song, Fei, 2007. "Cross-national gender differences in behavior in a threshold public goods game: Japan versus Canada," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 242-260, April.
  3. Yasuyo Hamaguchi & Satoshi Mitani & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2003. "Does the Varian Mechanism Work?--Emissions Trading as an Example," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 2(2), pages 85-96, August.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Yasuyo Hamaguchi & Toshiji Kawagoe, 2005. "An Experimental Study of Leniency Programs," Discussion papers 05003, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

    Cited by:

    1. Lydia Mechtenberg & Gerd Muehlheusser & Andreas Roider, 2017. "Whistle-Blower Protection: Theory and Experimental Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 6394, CESifo.
    2. Ulrich Blum & Nicole Steinat & Michael Veltins, 2008. "On the rationale of leniency programs: a game-theoretical analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(3), pages 209-229, June.
    3. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Buccirossi, Paolo, 2006. "Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers," CEPR Discussion Papers 5465, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  2. Yasuyo Hamaguchi & Satoshi Mitani & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2004. "Does the Varian Mechanism Work? -Emissions Trading as an Example," Discussion papers 04009, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).

    Cited by:

    1. Charness, Gary & Frechette, Guillaume R. & Qin, Cheng-Zhong, 2007. "Endogenous transfers in the Prisoner's Dilemma game: An experimental test of cooperation and coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 287-306, August.
    2. Riccardo Ghidoni & Anna Lou Abatayo & Valentina Bosetti & Marco Casari & Massimo Tavoni, 2023. "Governing Climate Geoengineering: Side Payments Are Not Enough," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 10(5), pages 1149-1177.
    3. Estelle Midler & Charles Figuières & Marc Willinger, 2013. "Choice overload, coordination and inequality: three hurdles to the effectiveness of the compensation mechanism?," Working Papers 13-01, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Feb 2013.
    4. Yan Chen & Robert Gazzale, 2004. "When Does Learning in Games Generate Convergence to Nash Equilibria? The Role of Supermodularity in an Experimental Setting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1505-1535, December.
    5. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, 2018. "Approval mechanism to solve prisoner’s dilemma: comparison with Varian’s compensation mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 51(1), pages 65-77, June.
    6. Tatsuyoshi Saijo & Takehito Masuda & Takafumi Yamakawa, "undated". "Approval Mechanism to Solve Prisoner’s Dilemma: Comparison with Varian’s Compensation Mechanism," Working Papers SDES-2016-15, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management.
    7. Anita Kopanyi-Peuker & Theo Offerman & Randolph Sloof, 2012. "Fostering Cooperation through the Enhancement of Own Vulnerability," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-132/I, Tinbergen Institute.
    8. Lu Dong & Rod Falvey & Shravan Luckraz, 2016. "Fair share and social effciency: a mechanism in which peers decide on the payoff division," Discussion Papers 2016-10, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

  3. Hirota, S. & Saijo, T. & Hamaguchi, Y. & Kawagoe, T., 2000. "Does the Free-rider Problem Occur in Corporate Takeovers? Evidence from Laboratory Markets," ISER Discussion Paper 0512, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.

    Cited by:

    1. Ann B. Gillette & Thomas H. Noe, 2006. "If at First You Don't Succeed: The Effect of the Option to Resolicit on Corporate Takeovers," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(2), pages 561-603.

Articles

  1. Hamaguchi, Yasuyo & Kawagoe, Toshiji & Shibata, Aiko, 2009. "Group size effects on cartel formation and the enforcement power of leniency programs," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 145-165, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Abbink, Klaus & Wu, Kevin, 2017. "Reward self-reporting to deter corruption: An experiment on mitigating collusive bribery," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 256-272.
    2. Jeffrey V. Butler & Danila Serra & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2017. "Motivating Whistleblowers," CEIS Research Paper 419, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 12 Dec 2017.
    3. Joseph E. Harrington Jr. & Myong-Hun Chang, 2015. "When Can We Expect a Corporate Leniency Program to Result in Fewer Cartels?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(2), pages 417-449.
    4. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Nyreröd, Theo, 2019. "Financial Incentives for Whistleblowers: A Short Survey," SITE Working Paper Series 50, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
    5. Tebbe, Eva, 2018. "Once bitten, twice shy? Market size affects the effectiveness of a leniency program by (de-)activating hysteresis effects," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168304, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, revised 2018.
    6. Nick Feltovich & Yasuyo Hamaguchi, 2018. "The Effect of Whistle‐Blowing Incentives on Collusion: An Experimental Study of Leniency Programs," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 84(4), pages 1024-1049, April.
    7. Béatrice Boulu-Reshef & Constance Monnier-Schlumberger, 2019. "Lutte contre les cartels : comment dissuader les têtes brûlées ?," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-03578113, HAL.
    8. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloé & Bigoni, Maria, 2009. "Fines, Leniency and Rewards in Antitrust: an Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 7417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Peter T. Dijkstra & Marco A. Haan & Lambert Schoonbeek, 2021. "Leniency Programs and the Design of Antitrust: Experimental Evidence with Free-Form Communication," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 59(1), pages 13-36, August.
    10. Jeong Yeol Kim & Charles N. Noussair, 2023. "Leniency Policies and Cartel Success: An Experiment," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 187-210, September.
    11. Bigoni, Maria & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloé & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2014. "Trust, Leniency and Deterrence," Konkurrensverket Working Paper Series in Law and Economics 2014:2, Konkurrensverket (Swedish Competition Authority).
    12. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Crede, Carsten J., 2020. "Post-cartel tacit collusion: Determinants, consequences, and prevention," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    13. Gomez-Martinez, Francisco, 2017. "Partial Cartels and Mergers with Heterogenous Firms: Experimental Evidence," EconStor Preprints 169380, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    14. Georg Clemens & Holger A. Rau, 2019. "Do discriminatory leniency policies fight hard‐core cartels?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(2), pages 336-354, April.
    15. Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof & Le Coq, Chloé & Bigoni, Maria, 2012. "Trust and Deterrence," CEPR Discussion Papers 9002, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Harold Houba & Evgenia Motchenkova & Quan Wen, 2014. "The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 14-146/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    17. Catarina Marvão & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2018. "Cartels and leniency: Taking stock of what we learnt," Chapters, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II, chapter 4, pages 57-90, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Karine Brisset & Francois Cochard & Eve-Angeline Lambert, 2023. "Is Amnesty Plus More Successful in Fighting Multimarket Cartels? An Exploratory Analysis," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(2), pages 211-237, September.
    19. Jochem, Annabelle & Parrotta, Pierpaolo & Valletta, Giacomo, 2020. "The impact of the 2002 reform of the EU leniency program on cartel outcomes," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    20. Peter T. Dijkstra & Jonathan Frisch, 2018. "Sanctions and Leniency to Individuals, and its Impact on Cartel Discoveries: Evidence from the Netherlands," De Economist, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 111-134, March.
    21. Carsten J. Crede & Liang Lu, 2016. "The effects of endogenous enforcement on strategic uncertainty and cartel deterrence," Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science (CBESS) 16-08, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    22. Jan Potters & Sigrid Suetens, 2013. "Oligopoly Experiments In The Current Millennium," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 439-460, July.
    23. Andrey V. Makarov, 2014. "Comparative Analusis Of Antitrust Policy Against Collusion In Some Transition Economies: Challenges For Effectiveness," HSE Working papers WP BRP 20/PA/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    24. Gomez-Martinez, Francisco, 2016. "Partial Cartels and Mergers with Heterogeneous Firms: Experimental Evidence," MPRA Paper 81132, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 01 Jul 2017.
    25. Hinloopen, Jeroen & Onderstal, Sander, 2014. "Going once, going twice, reported! Cartel activity and the effectiveness of antitrust policies in experimental auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 317-336.

  2. Bram Cadsby, C. & Hamaguchi, Yasuyo & Kawagoe, Toshiji & Maynes, Elizabeth & Song, Fei, 2007. "Cross-national gender differences in behavior in a threshold public goods game: Japan versus Canada," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 242-260, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Dennis D. Fehrenbacher & Claudia R Schneider & Elke U. Weber, 2017. "Catch me if I fall: Cross-national differences in willingness to take financial risks as a function of social and state ‘cushioning’," LWS Working papers 16, LIS Cross-National Data Center in Luxembourg.
    2. De Hoop, Thomas & Van Kempen, Luuk & Fort, Ricardo, 2010. "Do people invest in local public goods with long-term benefits: Experimental evidence from a shanty town in Peru," MPRA Paper 24968, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Brandts, Jordi & Garofalo, Orsola, 2012. "Gender pairings and accountability effects," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 31-41.
    4. Yohei Mitani & Nicholas Flores, 2007. "Does gender matter for demand revelation in threshold public goods experiments?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(27), pages 1-7.
    5. Yohei Mitani & Nicholas E. Flores, 2009. "Demand Revelation, Hypothetical Bias, and Threshold Public Goods Provision," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 44(2), pages 231-243, October.
    6. Victoria V Rostovtseva & Franz J Weissing & Anna A Mezentseva & Marina L Butovskaya, 2020. "Sex differences in cooperativeness—An experiment with Buryats in Southern Siberia," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(9), pages 1-15, September.
    7. Zhong, Li-Xin & Xu, Wen-Juan & He, Yun-Xin & Zhong, Chen-Yang & Chen, Rong-Da & Qiu, Tian & Shi, Yong-Dong & Ren, Fei, 2017. "A generalized public goods game with coupling of individual ability and project benefit," Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 73-80.
    8. Lisa Anderson & Francis DiTraglia & Jeffrey Gerlach, 2011. "Measuring altruism in a public goods experiment: a comparison of U.S. and Czech subjects," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(3), pages 426-437, September.
    9. Scott Barrett, 2007. "The Smallpox Eradication Game," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 179-207, January.
    10. Rachel Croson & Uri Gneezy, 2009. "Gender Differences in Preferences," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 448-474, June.

  3. Yasuyo Hamaguchi & Satoshi Mitani & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2003. "Does the Varian Mechanism Work?--Emissions Trading as an Example," International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 2(2), pages 85-96, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2005-02-27
  2. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (1) 2005-02-27
  3. NEP-REG: Regulation (1) 2005-02-27

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