Product risk sharing by warranties in a monopoly market with risk-averse consumers
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- A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, 1983.
"Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power,"
Bell Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 581-589, Autumn.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & William P. Rogerson, 1982. "Products Liability, Consumer Misperceptions, and Market Power," NBER Working Papers 0937, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael Spence, 1977. "Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 561-572.
- Walter Y. Oi, 1973. "The Economics of Product Safety," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 4(1), pages 3-28, Spring.
- Emons, Winand, 1989. " The Theory of Warranty Contracts," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(1), pages 43-57.
- Duncan P. Mann & Jennifer P. Wissink, 1988. "Money-Back Contracts with Double Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 285-292, Summer.
- Nancy A. Lutz & Philip H. Dybvig, 1989.
"Warranties, Durability, and Maintenance: Two Sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
922, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Philip H. Dybvig & Nancy A. Lutz, 1993. "Warranties, Durability, and Maintenance: Two-sided Moral Hazard in a Continuous-Time Model," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 60(3), pages 575-597.
- Russell Cooper & T.W. Ross, 1984.
"Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
716, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Geoffrey Heal, 1977. "Guarantees and Risk-Sharing," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(3), pages 549-560.
- Nancy A. Lutz, 1989. "Warranties as Signals under Consumer Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 239-255, Summer.
- Schlesinger, Harris, 1985. "Product safety for a monopolist under strict liability," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 253-261, October.
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